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ACCESS DENIED: IMPROPER USE OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD
AND ABUSE ACT TO CONTROL INFORMATION ON
PUBLICLY ACCESSffiLE INTERNET WEBSITES
CHRISTINE

D.

GALBRAITH*

Imagine that you are walking down the sidewalk on a public
street on your way to the grocery store. You notice a new produce
market with a huge front display window that has a sign stating
"Grand Opening: Huge Produce Sale." The advertisement lists the
price per pound of various fruits and vegetables and is completely visi
ble from the street. You copy down the prices of various items on a
piece of paper you have in your wallet, intending to compare the
prices advertised with those at the grocery store you normally
frequent.
Have you done something wrong? Could your behavior even be
categorized as criminal? Such a suggestion probably seems absurd.
Nonetheless, strange as it may seem, if this same scenario were to oc
cur within the electronic world, it is possible that you might have vio
lated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 1
Hacking has been defined as illegally gaining access to and some
times tampering with information in a computer system. 2 Addition
ally, transmitting a computer virus that corrupts and disables a
computer system also constitutes hacking. 3 But does hacking include
accessing and using the uncopyrightable, factual information 4 that a
company has chosen to post on a publicly accessible website? 5 Anum

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S., University of
Illinois; J.D., University of Illinois. Many thanks to Maureen O'Rourke, Laura Underkuf.
fler, Colleen Khoury, Lois Lupica, jennifer Wriggins, and Don Zillman for their insightful
comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Addi~onally, I would like to thank the partici
pants in both the New England junior Faculty Exchange and the Faculty Workshop at the
University of Maine School of Law for allowing me to present the arguments in this paper
at an early stage of development, as well as obtain invaluable comments and thoughts.
I. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
2. See Merriam-Webster Online, at http://www.merriamwebster.com (last visited Jan.
21, 2004) (defining "hack" as "to gain access to a computer illegally").
3. See Michael Lee et al., Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search f<rr Legiti11UlCJ: A
Regulatury Proposa~ 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 839, 849 (1999) (noting that "[i]njecting mali
cious code (commonly referred to as 'viruses') is another type of hacking with potentially
devastating effects").
4. See infra Part II (distinguishing protectable and unprotectable material under copy
right law).
5. The tenn "publicly accessible" or "publicly available" refers to websites on the
World Wide Web that are openly accessible to the general public.
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ber of companies have recently tried to argue-and have surprisingly
succeeded-in convincing courts that it should. 6
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet, once used only by government agencies and univer
sities, has quickly become an important mechanism for commerce. 7
In 1991, the first web page in the United States was posted on the
World Wide Web. 8 Current estimates, however, place the number of
web pages on the Internet at three billion. 9 This phenomenal rate of
growth is due in large part to the utilization of the Internet as a major
commercial center. Companies once relegated to the world of "bricks
and mortar," 10 have now staked out their place in cyberspace. This
often includes creating a website that provides information to the
public about the goods or services the company offers, as well as a
means for obtaining or ordering them. 11 The free flow of information
is viewed as one of the most important and defining features of the
Internet, 12 leading to its nickname, the "Information Superhighway."
Unfortunately, data once unquestionably part of the public do
main is now increasingly becoming subjected to private claims of own
ership. In an attempt to control competition and maintain market
share, companies are now seeking to prevent the utilization of the
6. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(enjoining defendant from accessing noncopyrightable information on plaintiff's website).
7. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that "companies are racing to stake out their place in cyber
space"); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing
the rapid growth of the World Wide Web),
8. Paul Festa, Ten Yean' Ago: Switching on the World Wide Web, CNET News.com, Dec. 10,
2001, at http:/ /news.zdnet.co.uk.
9. Yuki Nogachi, Online Search Engines Help Lift Cou1!1' of Priuacy, WASH. PosT, Feb. 9,
2004, at AI.
10. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 n.ll (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
The phrase "brick and mortar" is often used to designate a traditional business
when contrasting it with a predominantly, or entirely, on-line business. The
phrase appears to refer to the historical reliance on conducting commerce within
the context of a physical space made from materials such as brick and mortar, as
opposed to the modem trend toward conducting commerce in a cyberspace
made from computer programs.
I d.
11. See, e.g., Bestbuy.com, at http:/ /www.bestbuy.com (providing information regard
ing the retailer's products and giving customers the option of buying these products on
line).
12. Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Vinual Gatekeepm and the Right to Exclude
Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 179, 183 (2001) (asserting that "[t]he decentralized nature
of the Internet was considered one of its most significant characteristics" and that the In
ternet was expecte~ to create "a potentially more decentralized flow of infonna~on").
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factual information on their websites by those they deem unwel
come.13 However, this data, which website owners are seeking to pro
tect, is material that they have intentionally released for public
review. 14 Furthermore, the information itself does not qualify for
copyright protection because it does not meet the constitutional re
quirement of originality. 15 AI; such, it should be part of the public
domain and, therefore, available to anyone without restriction. 16 Any
attempt to grant private rights in this information arguably runs afoul
of the Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment. 17
Despite this, companies have argued that they have proprietary
rights in the information contained on these websites or alternatively
on the servers upon which the publicly available websites reside. 18
Furthermore, they have argued that as property owners they alone can
decide the terms upon which access is granted to these Internet sites,
as well as the way in which the information contained therein can be
used. 19 To the extent that any conduct exceeds the scope of these
virtually unchecked restrictions, the companies contend that such be
havior amounts to hacking-even if it causes no real harm. 20
In particular, many of these companies have tried to prevent elec
tronic data gatherers from accessing and utilizing the information on
their websites. 21 These computerized agents-often referred to as
"robots," "spiders," or "crawlers"-can quickly and efficiently collect
the public information contained on a website. 22 However, because
13. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D. N.Y. 2000)
(describing the plaintiff's desire to enjoin the defendant from accessing the plaintiff's
database).
14. See, e.g., id. (noting that the plaintiff pursued the suit even though it "acknowl·
edge[d] its obligation to provide public access to its customers' contact information").
15. See infra Part II (discussing requirements for copyright protection).
16. See infra Part VII (proposing an amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
that would deny proteCtion for factual information on publicly accessible websites). ·
17. See infra Part II (reviewing the constitutional restraints on copyright protection).
18. See infra Part V; see also Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the
internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 561, 57480 (2001) (dis
cussing cases in which companies sued aggregators of product and pricing information).
19. In one case, for example, the website owner objected to the defendant copying
facts from the plaintiff's website and publishing those facts in its own format. See Tick~
etmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. I 0, 2000).
20. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (noting that eBay argued that the defendant "interferred with eBay's possessory in·
terest in its computer system" by using data obtained from eBay's website).
21. See, e.g., id.
22. See O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570 (stating that those tools "allow the engines to
amass information more quickly than a manual approach that would require entering each
link into the browser and following its path").
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software robots are generally used by competitors, as opposed to po
tential customers, they are often viewed as unwelcome guests.
Nevertheless, choosing to place a publicly accessible website on
the Internet should indicate consent to at least a certain amount of
access and use of such information by both private and commercial
users. 23 Furthermore, the fact that someone or something has a com
mercial purpose should not determine whether access is proper. This
is particularly true in light of the public benefit that accrues from
competition in the marketplace. 24 Additionally, these robots are. col
lecting non-copyrightable information that is generally designed to be
free. 25
In this battle for control, companies have recently turned to a
new weapon-the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). 26 The
CFAA was originally enacted in 1984 as a criminal statute to address
hacking and the growing problem of computer crime. 27 In a single,
comprehensive statute, it sought to define illegal conduct and provide
for criminal liability. The statute has been amended several times,
most recently in 2001. 28 One of the most notable changes occurred in
1994 when a civil remedy was added. 29 Congress originally conceived
the CFAA as a way to encourage institutions to improve computer se
curity practices and supplement the resources of law enforcement in
combating computer crime. 30
However, the CFAA is now being used to control access to and
the use of information contained on publicly available websites. 31 Re
cent court decisions have allowed website owners to utilize the CFAA
to override the carefully balanced provisions of the copyright laws and
improperly restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment. 32 Ad
ditionally with recent changes to the CFAA, a website owner will often
23. ld. at 620.
24. See infra Part IV; see also O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 620.
25. Lawrence Lessig, Fornnard to Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm,
52 STAN. L. REv. 987, 996 (2000).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
27. The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98473, 98 StaL 1837, 2190 (1984); see infra Part III.
28. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814, 115 StaL 366, 382 (2001).
29. Pub. L. No. 10$-322, § 290001, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097-99 (1994).
30. 146 CoNe. REc. 510,916 (daily ed. OcL 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
31. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., I26 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
'(enjoining defendant from accessing publicly available information on plaintiff's website);
see also infra notes 126-143 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the holding of
Register.wm).
32. See &gistl!1'.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 255; see also infra notes 317-319 and accom
panying text (explaining that a statute protecting factual material may violate the First
Amendment).
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find that the elements required for a CFAA cause of action are far
easier to prove than any other type of potentially applicable claim,
including the common law claim of trespass. 33
This Article argues that, although many of these actions may fall
within the _literal language of the CFAA, such cases were never in
tended to be covered by the statute. Additionally, by allowing website
owners to protect information that is not protectable under copyright
law, the CFAA unconstitutionally overrides the delicate balance of
rights between authors and the public. Such a sweeping reading of
prohibited acts under the CFAA threatens the free flow of informa
tion that belongs in the public domain. As a result, the continued
openness of the Internet, along with its attendant benefits, is at risk.
This Article begins in Part II by briefly explaining why the factual
information that website owners seek to control is not protectable
under copyright law. Next, Part III of this Article examines the history
and purpose of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Part IV explores
the way in which software robots gather information on the Internet
and why companies have tried to limit their use. Part V looks at the
elements of a CFAA claim, including the way companies have sought
to define unauthorized access under the Act. Part VI discusses the
constitutional confines within which Congress can create private prop
erty rights in information. Part VI also examines the proprietary
rights of publicly accessible website owners and whether such rights
should include the right to prohibit software robots from accessing
the information contained on their Internet sites or alternatively the
servers upon which the websites reside. Part VII suggests language
that could be used to amend the CFAA to ensure its constitutionality.
Additionally, Part VII reviews and evaluates alternative methods for
controlling truly harmful robot behavior.

II.

CoPYRIGHT

LAw

The Copyright Act34 provides that copyright protection extends
to only "original works of authorship," as originality is a constitutional
requirement. 35 To be original, the work must be independently cre
ated, in other words not copied from another work. Additionally, it
33. See infra notes 26&-296 and accompanying text (discussing changes to the CFAA"s
definition of loss).
34. 17 u.s.c. § 102 (2000).
35. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to "secur[e] for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries");
see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (declaring that
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement").
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must possess "at least some minimal degree of creativity." 36 This re
quirement is not particularly burdensome, as a relatively low level of
creativity will usually suffice. 37
Facts, however, do not even meet this modest threshold. As the
Supreme Court made clear in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Seroice Co., 38 "[n] o one may claim originality as to facts ... because
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship ...·. [T] hey may
not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to
every person." 39 This is because one who reports a particular fact has
not created it; he or she has merely discovered its existence. 40 Be
cause data is not "original" in the constitutional sense, it may not be
copyrighted. 41 Instead, it remains in the public domain, available to
every person. 42
This is true even if the facts are contained within a work that is
copyrightable as a whole. One fundamental principle of copyright law
is the "idea-expression" or "fact-expression" dichotomy, which applies
to all works of authorship. 43 In the context of factual works, only the
author's selection and arrangement may be protected, while the facts
themselves may be copied at wi11. 44 This secures protection for the
author's original expression, while allowing others to freely build
upon the ideas and information contained within a work without seek
ing the creator's permission. 45 As the Supreme Court has explained,
"[t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortunate, [but] is the means by
which copyright advances the progress of science and art." 46 Copy
right seeks to reward originality, not effort. 47
For example, the Copyright Act expressly provides for the protec
tion of compilations. 48 A compilation consists of a collection of preex
36. Feis~ 499 U.S. at 345 (citing I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, CoPYRIGHT§§ 2.01 [A], [8]
(1990)).
37. Id.
38. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
39. /d. at 347-48 (citing I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COP'iRIGHT §§ 2.01 (A], (B] (1990)
and Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981)).
40. !d. at 347.
41. /d.
42. /d. at 348 (citing Miller, 650 F.2d at 1369).
43. !d. at 350.
44. !d.
45. !d. at 350-51.
46. !d. at 350.
47. !d. at 359-60 ("[O]riginality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone of copyright
protection in directories and other fact-based works ... ).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (stating that "[t]he subject matter of copyright as specified
. by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works").,
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isting data selected and arranged by an author. 49 If the organization
of the materials is made independently by the compiler and entails a
minimal degree of creativity, such works contain sufficient originality
to be entitled to copyright protection. 5° A subsequent compiler, how
ever, is free to use the facts contained in another's work so long as the
new work does not include the same selection and arrangement of
materiaJ.5 1 The mere inclusion of a particular fact in a work does not
transform that fact into protectable intellectual property. 5 2
In the context of a website, even though some elements of an
Internet site may be protectable under the copyright law, factual infor
mation is supposed to remain in the public domain. 5 3 For example, a
site may contain photographs or illustrations that may be copyrighted.
However, information concerning a particular product's price, dimen
sions, or the sizes in which it is available are merely facts that anyone
else should be free to use. 54 Furthermore, the extraction and use of
such information is "essential to achieving the constitutional goal of
copyright law." 55 The balance of rights in copyright law is rooted in
the belief that society is best served by the free flow of information. 5 6
As facts and ideas constitute the building blocks of knowledge, it is
imperative that they remain within the public domain. Despite the
recent claims of website owners to the contrary, the use of such infor
mation without the website owner's permission should not constitute
a criminal act.
Ill.

HISTORY OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE

A=

In response to a growing wave of hacking incidents and related
computer fraud, Congress enacted the first federal computer crime
statute in 1984 entitled the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (Counterfeit Access Device Act). 57 Instead of
49. !d. § I 01.
50. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
51. !d. at 349.
52. /d. at 35().56.
53. See zd. at 348 (declaring that "all facts-scientific, historical, biographical-are part
of the public domain").
54. See zd. at 349 ("[T]he very same facts and ideas may be divorced from the context
imposed by the author, and restated or reshuffied by second comers, even if the author was
the first to discover the facts or to propose the ideas.").
55. J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, lntelkctual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L.
R£v. 51, 129 (1997).
56. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50.
57. The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 9~73, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2000)); Jeff Nemerofsky, The Crime of "Interruption of Computer Services to Authorized Users"
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identifying and amending every potentially applicable statute affected
by advances in computer technology, Congress chose to address the
subject in a single statute. 58 "Congress was reluctant to preempt
or interfere with local and state computer crime authorities," 59
therefore, this original legislation was exceptionally narrow in
scope. 60
The statute prohibited unauthorized access to a computer sys
tem,61 but it only applied to "federal interest computers," 62 generally
Have you Ever Heard ofit?, 6 R!cH.j.L. & TECH. 23, ~ 13 (2000), available at http:/ /www.law.
richmond.edu/jolt/v6i5/article2.html.
58. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 5 (1996).
59. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1 13. All fifty states have some form of computer crime
legislation, however the scope of sanctioned conduct ranges from state to state: ALA. ConE
§§ 13A-8-100 to -103 (1994); ALAsKA STAT.§§ 11.46.200(a)(3), 11.46.484(a)(3), 11.46.740,
11.46.985 (Michie 2002); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 13-230l(E), 13-2316 (West 2001); ARK.
ConE ANN. §§ 5-41-101 to -108 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL ConE§§ 502, 502.01, 1203.047
(West 1999 & Supp. 2003); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-5.5- 101 to -102 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 53a-250 to -261 (West 2001); DEL. ConE ANN. tit.
II,§§ 931-939 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 815.01-.07 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); GA. ConE
ANN.§§ 16-9-90 to -94 (2003); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 708-890 to -895.7 (Michie 1999 &
Supp. 2002); IDAHO ConE§§ 18-2201 to -2202 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); 720 lt.t.. CoMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/160-1 to -7 (West 2003); IND. CooE ANN.§§ 35-43-1-4,35-43-2-3 (Michie 1998
& Supp. 2001); IowA ConE ANN.§§ 702.1A, 702.14, 714.1, 716.68 (West 2003); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3755 (1995 & Supp. 2002); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.840-.860 (Banks-Baldwin
2003); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 14:73.1-.5 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, §§ 431-433 (West 1983 & Supp. 2002); Mo. CoDE ANN., CRIM. LAw§ 7-302 (2002);
Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 146 (2002); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266, §§ 30, 33A, 120F
(West 2000); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 752.791-.797 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); MINN.
STAT. A'IN. §§ 609.87-.891 (West 2003); Miss. ConE ANN. §§ 97-45-1 to -13 (1994 & Supp.
2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.095-.099 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003); MoNT. ConE ANN.
§§ 45-6-310 to -3ll (2003); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1343 to -1348 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT.
A"<N. §§ 205.473-.513 (Michie 2001); N.H. REv. STAT, ANN.§§ 638:16 to :34 (1996 & Supp.
2002); NJ. STAT. A'<N. §§ 2A:38A-l to -6 (West 2000), 2C:20-23 to -34 (West 1995); N.M.
STAT. A"<N. §§ 30-45-1 to -7 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 156.00-.50
(McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -458 (2002); N.D. CENT. ConE §§ 12.1
06.1-{Jl, 12.1-06.1-08 (1997 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REv. ConE ANN.§ 2913.04(8) (Anderson
2002); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1951-1958 (West 2002); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 164.125,
164.377 (2001 ); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§§ 7603, 7611 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 11
52-1 to -8 (2002); S.C. CooE ANN. §§ 16-16-10 to -40 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws§§ 43-438-1 to -8 (Michie !997 & Supp. 2003); TENN. ConE ANN.§§ 39-14-601 to -603
(1997 & Supp. 2002); TEx. PENAL CooE A"<N. §§ 33.01-.04 (Vernon 2003); UTAH ConE A'IN.
§§ 76-6-701 to -705 (1995); VT. STAT. A"<N. tit. 13, §§ 4101-4107 (1998 & Supp. 2003); VA.
ConE A'IN. §§ 18.2-152.2 to .14 (Michie 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A52.110-.!30
(West 2000); W.VA. CODE ANN.§§ 61-3C-! to -21 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 943.70 (West 1996 & Supp. 2002); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-501 to -505 (Michie
2003).
60. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1 13.
61. The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Puh.
L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-94 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2000)). The Act made it a felony to knowingly access a computer without authorization
or to exceed authorized access in order ~o obtain classified United States defense or for
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those computers operated by the federal government or a financial
institution. 63 This was due to Congress's belief that these computer
systems merited special protection, as they contained the most sensi
tive types of information-namely classified information, financial
records, and credit histories. 64
However, because the Counterfeit Access Device Act only applied
to select types of confidential information, it immediately fell subject
to harsh criticism from legislators, industry leaders, and law enforce
ment officials. 65 Additionally, the law was deemed too vague and diffi
cult to use. 66 In fact, only one person was ever indicted under the
1984 Counterfeit Access Device Act. 67
In response, Congress amended the Counterfeit Access Device
Act in 1986 by enacting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA or
the Act). 68 The CFAA eliminated some of the Counterfeit Access De
vice Act's confusing language, defined additional terms, and ex
panded its scope. 69 In particular, three additional types of computer
crimes were added: a computer fraud offense patterned after the fed
eral mail and wire fraud statutes; an offense for the alteration, dam
age, or destruction of information contained in a federal interest
eign relations information with the intent or reason to believe that such information would
be used to hann the United States or to advantage a foreign nation. /d. Additionally, the
Act made it a misdemeanor to knowingly access a computer without authorization or to
exceed authorized access to obtain information contained in a financial record of a finan
cial institution or in a consumer file of a consumer reporting agency. /d. The 1984 Act
also made it a misdemeanor to knowingly access a computer without authorization or to
exceed authorized access in order to use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in, or
prevent authorized use of, a computer operated for or on behalf of the United States if
such conduct would affect the government's use of the computer. /d.
62. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 4 (1996). A "federal interest computer" was defined as a
computer
exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government,
·ar in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the
offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A) (2000).
63. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 4.
64. !d. at 3-5.
65. Frank P. Andreano, The Evolution of Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad Hoc A~
proach to an Ever-Changing Problem, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 85-86 (1999) (noting that "loan
records, corporate account information, or information concerning the bank's deposits in
other institutions" were not within the scope of the act).
66. !d. at 86; Glenn D. Baker, Note, Trespassers will be Prostcuted: Computer Crime in the
1990s, 12 CoMPUTER/LJ. 61, 65 (1993).
67. Baker, supa note 66, at 65.
68. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213-16
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)).
69. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1.1 4.
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computer; and an offense for the trafficking of unauthorized com
puter passwords in certain circumstances. 70
Over time, however, Congress became increasingly concerned
about loopholes in the statute that were arguably permitting some
hackers to escape punishment. 71 Additionally, both the type of activi
ties in which hackers were engaging and their range of motivations
had greatly broadened, making Congress eager to give the federal
government more expansive authority to capture them. 72 As a result,
in 1994 Congress again amended the CFAA as part of a more compre
hensive omnibus crime bill entitled The Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 73
Although the CFAA previously had dealt with only conduct re
lated to the unauthorized access of a computer system, the 1994
amendments expanded the coverage of the Act to include the trans
mission of computer worms and viruses. 74 Moreover, the amendment
added a civil remedy in addition to the statute's original criminal sanc
tions?5 With the dramatic rise in the number of computer crime
cases, the government did not have the ability to pursue all computer
crime cases. 76 As such, the civil remedy was designed to provide not
only aggrieved individuals with the ability to obtain relief for violations
of the Act, but also to increase the deterrent value of the statute. 77
The sponsors of the amendment made clear, however, that they
certainly and expressly did not want to "open the floodgates to frivo
lous litigation." 78 But at the time this civil remedy was added, the
CFAA still only applied to "federal interest computers," namely those
computers that contained the most sensitive confidential information
and were operated by the government or a financial institution. 79 As a
result, the pool of potential plaintiffs was quite limited. This, how
ever, changed two years later.

70. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act§ 2(d).
71. Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic Analysis of
Anti-Hacking Regulatary Models, 89 Gw. LJ. 171, 179 (2000).
72. !d.
73. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 290001, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097-99 (1994).
74. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 4 (1996); Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1 26.
75. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 290001(d), 108 Stat. at 2098. The civil remedy provision
allowed victims of computer abuse to maintain actions against the violators to obtain com
pensatory damages, if!iunctive relief, or other equilable relief. /d.
76. 146 CoNe. R>:c. S10,916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
77. !d.
78. !d. (quoting 136 CoNe. R>:c. 54,614 (1990) (statement of Sen. Leahy)).
79. !d.
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The 1996 amendments to the CFAA80 expanded coverage of the
Act to include not only "federal interest computers," but all com
puters used in interstate commerce. 81 This effectively extended the
statute's reach to include any computer connected to the lnternet. 82
The change was prompted in part by a growing concern over the
amount of financial losses suffered by American companies from the
breach of computer security systems. 83 With society's increased de
pendence on computers, it was becoming clear that computer crime
was not just a law enforcement issue, but had economic implications
as well. 84
The sponsors of the bill, therefore, felt it was essential to extend
the statute's scope to further protect the confidentiality of computer
data, as well as the systems upon which the data resided. 85 References
can be found throughout the amendment's legislative history that
support the premise that the changes were designed to safeguard the
privacy of information. 86 Ultimately, the amendment's sponsors
80. The 1996 amendments to the Act were originally entitled the National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 ("Nl!PA"). 142 CoNG. REc. SI0,889 (daily ed. Sept.
18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy). But when the Nl!PA was introduced in 1995, it failed
to emerge from the Judiciary Committee Proceedings. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 'i 28.
However, in October of 1996, President Clinton signed the Nl!PA into law as part of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201, llO Stat. 3488, 3491-93
(1996).
81. The term "federal interest computer" was replaced with "protected computer." See
18 U.S.C. § 1030(2) (c) (2000). A "protected computer" was defined as a computer
exclusively for the we of a financial institution or the United States Govemment,
or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a finan
cial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the
offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication.
!d.§ 1030(e)(2)(A)-(B).
82. Calkins, supra note 71, at 180.
83. 142 CoNG. REc. SI0,889 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy). A
December 1995 report from the Computer Systems Policy Project, which included the
CEOs from thirteen maJor computer companies, estimated that breaches of computer se
curity resulted in financial losses of $2 to $4 billion dollars. I d. The report also predicted
that the numbers were likely to rise to $40 to $80 billion dollars worldwide in the year
2000. ld.
84. Id.
85. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 3 (1996) ("!. Purpose: [The amendment] would
strengthen the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, by closing gaps in the
law to protect better the confidentiality, integrity, and security of computer data and
networks.").
86. 142 CoNG. REc. Sl0,889 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[W]hile our current statute,
in section 1030(a)(2) prohibits misuse of a computer to obtain information from a finan
cial institution, it falls short of protecting the privacy and confidentiality of information on
computers used in interstate or foreign commerce and communications."); S. REP. No.
104-357, at 7 (!996) ("The bill woulc;l amend 1030(a)(2) to increa•e protection for the
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hoped that the changes would also help ensure the public's faith in
the security of computer networks. 87 Noticeably absent from the legis
lative history, however, is any suggestion that Congress intended to
widen dramatically the protection of the CFAA to include all informa
tion and all computer systems on the Internet, such as non-copyright
able data contained on publicly accessible websites. 88 Nevertheless,
the statutory language itself was not modified to make clear that the
provisions of the CFAA only applied to private, confidential informa
tion.89 Instead, the Act as drafted appears to include protection for
any type of information, despite the legislative history to the
contrary. 90
Most recently, the CFAA was amended in October of 2001 by the
USA Patriot Act. 91 The USA Patriot Act's provisions were primarily
designed to combat terrorism and provide law enforcement with addi
tional investigatory tools. 92 However, the USA Patriot Act also in
cluded language from an earlier Senate bill entitled The Internet
Security Act of 2000. 93 The USA Patriot Act amended the CFAA in
order to rectifY some of the more technical ambiguities of the CFAA
identified in earlier court cases and to clarify the scope of the civil
remedy. 94 However, there were no changes that explicitly restricted
the scope of the Act to confidential information, 95 and as such, the
CFAA still arguably provides a potentially valuable tool for entities
hoping to protect publicly accessible factual information. 96
privacy and confidentiality of computer information ... [t]he premise of this subsection is
privacy protection.").
87. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7.
88. See id. (" [W] here the information stolen is also copyrighted. the theft may implicate
certain rights under the copyright laws.").
89. 18 U.S.C. § !030(a) (2)(C), (h) (2000) (stating that "[w]hoever ... intentionally
accesse.s a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized acc:;ess, and thereby ob
tains ... infonnation from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or
foreign communication ... shall be punished"). The statute does not exclude information
that is not protectable under copyright law. See id.
90. See id. (failing to describe the type of information protected by the Act).
91. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814, 115 Stat. 272, 382
(2001).
92. !d. § I.
93. SeeS. 2448, 106th Cong., § 101-102 (2001).
94. See 146 CoNG. REc. S!0,913-916 (daily ed. Oct 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(noting the reasons for modifying the CFAA).
95. See 18 U .S.C. § I 030 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
96. See CarlS. Kaplan, Tough Tim£SjorDataRnhots, N.Y. TIMES, CvnrR LJ.,Jan. 12,2001,
at htlp:/ /www.nytimes.com (noting that .. the easier it becomes to use the law to thwart
robots, the easier it becomes for some companies to lock up or selectively protect publicly
available information").
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SorrwARE RosoTS

Businesses are increasingly targeting software robots for exclu
sion from their publicly available websites. 97 A software robot is a
computer program that can perform tasks on the Internet without
human supervision. 98 Some of the more typical functions include
compiling results for search engines, 99 filtering for inappropriate con
tent, or obtaining information made publicly accessible on the web
sites of others. 100 Software robots are capable of executing these tasks
at speeds far in excess of what a human can accomplish. 101
Software robots utilize the same web protocols as any individual
would to initially access information from an Internet website. 102
These hots simply request the information from the site, and the que
ried server usually responds with a copy of the document re
quested.103 However, unlike individuals, software robots engage in
97. See, e.g., eBay. Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (enjoining an online auction aggregation company from copying factual informa·
tion posted on a publicly accessible website).
98. James C. Luh, No Bats Allowed!, EWEEK ENTERPRISE NEWS & REVIEWS, Apr. 16, 2001,
wailable at http://www.eweek.com.
99. See Nettis Envtl. Ltd. v. fWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
The court defined a search engine as follows:
[A) special kind of website, containing a database of other known websites, associ
ating certain keywords with each website. The user provides the search engine
with [a term] or terms of interest to the user, and the search engine responds
with a list of websites on its database associated with the terms submitted by the
user.
!d.; see also Christine D. Galbraith, Ekctronic Billboards Along the Itiformation Superhighway:
Liability Under the Lanham Act for Using Trademarks to Key Internet Banner Ads, 41 B.C. L. REv.
847, 851-53 (2000) (discussing how search engines compile their search results). Some of
the most well-known search engines include Excite, Coogle, AltaVista, and Netscape. Id. at
851.
100. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explotica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001).
101. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 106(}.61.
102. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570 (noting that bots use the same web protocol as the
typical Internet user).
103. Id. This is not to say, however, that a server wil1 always provide the requested infor
mation. Software robots are launched from a particular Internet Protocol (IP) address.
David Kramer &Jay Monahan, Panel Discussion To Bot or Not to Bot: The Implications of Spider
ing. 22 HAsTINGS CoMM. & ENT. LJ. 241,245 (2000). When the computer requests infor
mation from another computer, the requesting computer must offer its IP address to the
responding computer in order for a response to be sent. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. If
repeated requests come from a particular IP address, this can often signal robotic activity.
ld. A responding computer that seeks to prohibit robots from accessing its site can then
choose to ignore or "block" any further requests from that particular IP address. Id. How
ever, this does not usually provide a long-term solution for the responding computer, as IP
addresses can change on a daily basis and requesting computers can also route their re
quests through other servers to appear as though these servers are the source of the origi
nal request. ld. Additionally, blocking technology also carries a risk of denying requests
from IP addresses that a responding ~omputer would actually want to serve. ld.
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what is referred to as "recursive retrieving" or "automated brows
ing."104 Once a web page is obtained from a particular website, the
software robot reviews the page and then requests all other pages that
are referenced therein. 105
This repetitive searching often imposes a burden on the re
quested website's server exceeding that generated by an individual re
viewing the very same pages of the website. 106 Website owners have
argued that this additional burden could lead to decreased response
time for "legitimate users," in other words, those users potentially in
terested in purchasing goods or services, not those merely competing
with the company. 107 Furthermore, these website owners argue that
consumption of the system's resources by these unwelcome users
could eventually result in an overload that may cause the system to
malfunction or "crash." 108 If such a severe malfunction were to occur,
data might be lost or service interrupted. 109
However, in all of the cases brought to date, the burden created
by these "illegitimate users" was minimal at bestY 0 The websites were
not affected in any appreciable way. The servers did not crash, and
website users did not experience any noticeable delays in accessing
the companies' web pages. 111 Furthermore, the software robots did
not cause any actual damage to the servers necessitating system
repairs. 1 12
Thus, it appears that these owners of publicly accessible websites
may be less concerned with actual harm to their computer system and
more interested in finding a way to protect themselves from increased
competition. 113 However, competition is essential to protecting con
104. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570; Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, The
Web Robots Pages, at http:/ /www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2004).
105. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570.
106. !d.
107. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and
Pricing Information?, 53 V AND. L. REv. 1965, 1980 (2000).
108. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.
109. !d.
110. See, e.g., id. at 1063 (noting that while the defendant accessed the plaintiff's website
100,000 times a day, that activity comprised at most 1.53% of the total number of requests);
see also Kaplan, supra note 96 (discussing recent decisions in which courts found that plain·
tiffs were not significantly burdened by the activities of software robots).
Ill. Kaplan, supra note 96.
112. !d.
113. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., Appellant, Supporting
Reversal, at 6, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No.
0().15995) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law) ("[E)stablished online
merchants have a substantial incentive .... to interfere with the flow of price and product
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sumers.' 14 The public benefits from a marketplace that provides a
variety of options. In fact, the U.S. government has recognized that
maintaining the open architecture of the Internet is essential to fos
tering valuable competition: 115 "Official decision makers must respect
the unique nature of the medium and recognize that widespread com
petition and increased consumer choice should be the defining fea
ture of the new digital marketplace." 116
This is not to say that a website owner will never be able to show
sufficient harm to outweigh the public benefit fostered by open access
to information. Where a software robot actually causes a website to
malfunction to such a degree that it is unable to serve its customers, a
remedy may be appropriate.' 17 However, such exceptional claims
should not be grounded in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, de
spite the fact that they may fit within the literal language of the CFAA.

v.

ELEMENTS OF A CFAA CLAIM

In order to bring a civil action under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, a party must be able to prove two main elements. First, a
party must show that a defendant has engaged in prohibited con
duct.'18 Second, a party must prove that it has suffered sufficient
harm as defined by the Act. 119 Before discussing why recent decisions
granting publicly available website owners proprietary rights in the ac
cess to and use of factual information are not only inappropriate, but
arguably unconstitutional, it is worth reviewing the basic requirements
of a CFAA claim in more detail.
A.

Principal Statutory Provisions upon which Website Owners
Base their Claims

Owners of publicly available websites, who have attempted to pre
vent their competitors from accessing and utilizing the non-copyright
information on the Internet."); O'Rourke, supra note 107. at 1981 (noting that "[s]uch
claims may have merit or may be asserted as a pretext to mask an anti-competitive intent")
(footnote omitted).
114. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law at 3-4, eBay (No. 00-15995).
115. !d. at 4.
116. William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., Framework fur Global Electronic Commerce 2 Uuly
I, 1997). available at http://dcc.syr.edu/ford/course/e<ommerce-framework.pdf.
117. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law at 13, eBay (No. 00-15995). "Trespass to
chattels 'lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property
has proximately caused injury." Id. (quoting Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. App. 2d
468, 475 (1996)).
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
119. Id. § 1030(g) (2000 & Supp. 2003),.
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able information contained therein, have based their claims on a
number of sections under the CFAA. Although the sections vary
slightly, each section requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
accessed a computer without authorization or exceeded authorized
access, which often becomes the primary focus in most CFAA cases. 120
Nonetheless, section (a) (2) (C) appears to be the section that is most
applicable in cases involving website owners trying to prohibit a com
petitor from accessing and utilizing information posted on their In
ternet site. 121 Additionally, it is probably one of the easiest sections
under which to state a claim.
The section prohibits a party from obtaining information by in
tentionally accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access. 122 The CFAA does not provide a definition for "in
formation." Despite the fact that the CFAA's legislative history sug
gests that the statute is designed to protect confidential
information, 123 as opposed to all other types of information, the statu
tory language is not so limited. 124 Furthermore, courts, in their inter
pretations of this provision, have not made such a distinction, but

120. In an attempt to clarify the elements required to bring a civil action under the
CFM the statute was amended in 2001 to provide that such an action could only be
brought "if the conduct involves [one] of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv),
or (v) of subsection (a) (5) (B) (i)." ld. At first glance this might appear to restrict civil
actions to suits alleging violations of Section (5). However, a more careful reading of the
statute reveals that this reference only seeks to incorporate expressly the requirement of
..loss" (except in those cases that involve (1) "the modification or impairment, or potential
modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment or care of 1
or more individuals"; (2) "physical injury to any person"; (3) "a threat to public health or
safety"; or (4) "damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in
furtherance of the administration ofjustice, national defense, or national security."). /d.
§ 1030(a) (5.) (B). Furthermore, the Act provides that "[a]ny person who suffers damage or
loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator
to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief." !d.
§ 1030(g).
Additionally, there is nothing in the legislative history of the amendment to suggest
that the drafters intended to limit civil actions to only those based on conduct prohibited
by Section (5). Instead, the legislative history indicates that the change to Section (g) was
made only to clarify the type of loss or harm required to maintain a civil action. 1'46 Co:\'G.
REc. 510,916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2000).
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2) (C) (2000) (prohibiting unauthorized users from acquir
ing information from protected computers in other states or countries).
122. !d. § 1030(a) (2).
123. See infra Part III (discussing references throughout the CFAA's legislative history
implying that the statute is designed to protect confidential information).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c). The statute fails to state that the information must
be confidential or privileged to be protecte~. ld.
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instead have enjoined defendants from accessing non-copyrightable
information freely available from plaintiffs' public websites. 125
For example in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the plaintiff, Regis
ter.com, Inc. (Register.com), sought a preliminary injunction prevent
ing the defendant, Verio, Inc. (Verio), from accessing and utilizing
the information contained on its website. 126 Register.com is a domain
name registrar, providing customers the ability to register a name in
the .com, .net., and .org top-level domains. 127 As part of its obligation
as an accredited domain name registrar, Register.com is required
under its contract with the national accrediting agency to provide an
online, interactive database containing the names, addresses, and
phone numbers of all customers who register domain names through
its services. 128
In addition to its domain name registration services, Register.com
offers a variety of other related services such as website creation tools,
website hosting, and electronic maiJ.I 29 The defendant, Verio, is one
of the largest operators of websites for businesses and a leading pro
vider of Internet services. 130 Although Verio is not a domain name
registrar, Register.com does compete directly with Verio to provide a
variety of other Internet services, including website hosting and
development. 131
In order to target more effectively their marketing and sales ef
forts, Verio wanted to find a way to recognize those entities in need of
web hosting services. 132 Companies that had recently registered a do
125. See, e.g.. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238,255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
126. !d. at 241.
127. /d.
A domain name has two parts-a second-level domain and a top--level domain.
The second-level domain consists of a term or series of terms, often a descriptive
term,. a company•s name or a brand-name. Top-level domains indicate the type of
organization that holds the address and include ".com" for commercial enter
prises, ".edu" for educational enterprises, ".org" for non-profit and miscellaneous
organizations, ...gov" for government sites, ".net" for networking providers, and
".miJ'' for military information sites.
Galbraith, supra note 99, at 851 (footnote omitted).
128. Register. com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 241-42. In order to become an accredited do
main name registrar, Register.com, like al1 registrars, was required to enter into a Registrar
Accreditation Agreement (the Accreditation Agreement) with the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). !d. ICANN is a private, not-for-profit corpo
ration that the U.S. Department of Commerce created to privatize the domain name sys
tem. /d. at 242 n.l. The Accreditation Agreement sets out all of the responsibilities of a
registrar and indudes the customer database requirement. /d. at 242.
129. /d. at 241.
130. !d.
131. Id.
132. !d. at 243.
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main name would most likely fall into this category. 133 Therefore,
Verio developed a software robot to access the contact information
databases each accredited registrar made publicly available on its web
site, including Register.com's Internet site. 134 The robot collected
this information on a daily basis, allowing Verio to identify quickly
potential customers for its services. 135
Register.com objected to Verio's compilation and use of the con
tact information appearing on its website. 136 In an attempt to prevent
the practice from continuing, Register.com sent Verio a letter request
ing that it cease and desist its conduct. 137 When Verio refused, Regis
ter.com filed suit alleging that Verio's actions violated section
(a) (2) (C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and moved for a
preliminary injunction. 138 Register.com alleged that Verio's conduct
had resulted in irreparable harm, including lost opportunities to sell
additional, competing services to its domain name registrants. 139
In granting the plaintiffs motion, the court did not analyze the
nature of the information at issue. The court did not mention that
the information on Register.com's website consisted merely of factual
data, such as names and addresses/ 40 which is not protectable under
copyright law. 141 Additionally, the court did not acknowledge that the
data that Verio obtained had been posted by Register.com onto its
publicly accessible Internet website. 142 Instead, the court summarily
held that Verio's software robots had acquired information from Reg
ister.com's website, thus satisfying the specialized requirements of sec
tion (a)(2)(C) of the CFAA. 143

133. /d.
134. /d.
135. /d.
136. /d. at 244.
137. !d.
138. ld. Register.com also alleged that Verio's actions were prohibited by section
(a) (5)(C) of the CFAA. ld. at 251. Additionally, Register.com claimed that Verio's con
duct violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and asserted claims for trespass to chattels
and breach of contract under the New York common law. !d. at 241.
139. !d. at 248.
140. /d. at 242 (noting that the information in the database consisted of customer
names and contact information).
141. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1990) (noting that
facts cannot be copyrighted because they are not original creations).
142. Regisler.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. at 242 (acknowledging that the information at issue
was "freely accessible to the public" on Register.com's website).
143. /d. at 252. The court also found that the plaintiff alleged sufficient damage as
required by the CFAA and showed that the defendant's conduct was unauthorized as de
fined by the statute. /d.
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Defining Unauthi!T'ized Access

A civil action plaintiff who alleges a violation of the CFAA will be
required to prove that the defendant's access to its Internet site was
either "without authorization" or "exceed[ed] authorized access." 144
This will generally be the case regardless of whether a plaintiff bases
its claim under section (a) (2) (C) or some other section of the Act.
The statute does not define "without authorization" and merely de
fines "exceeds authorized access" as "access[ing] a computer with au
thorization and [using] such access to obtain or alter information in
the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."w'
Even more problematic, however, is the fact that the CFAA does not
provide any limits on the types of activities that a party may deem to
be "unauthorized" nor does it restrict the manner in which these
prohibitions are communicated. 146
As a result, courts have granted website owners broad powers to
exclude others from accessing and utilizing the information con
tained on their publicly accessible websites. 147 These website owners
have been given virtually unchecked discretion to define which acts
constitute "unauthorized" conduct. 148 Through contracts, the robot
exclusion protocol, 149 and direct communication, website owners
have been remarkably successful in preventing visitors to their In
temet sites from engaging in any conduct they deem undesirable. 150

1. Mass-Market and Online "Contracts. "-Many publicly available
websites contain "terms and conditions of use" to which all visitors
that access the site are purportedly bound. 151 However, website visi
tors are typically not required to indicate consent to these provi
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2000).
145. !d. § 1030(e) (6).
146. See generaUy id. § 1030(e).
147. E.g., Register. com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 242-43, 253 (finding unauthorized access
under the CFAA where the defendant violated the terms of the plaintiff's self-<:reated terms
of use agreement). The court acknowledged "a movement away from nascent public regu·
lation of the Internet and toward a consensus-based private ordering regime." /d. at 247.
148. Cf. Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'! Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890,899 (N.D.
Iowa 2001) (choosing not to address the statutory meaning of authorization and finding
unauthorized access where the plaintiff's self-established "Terms of Service" were violated).
149. See infra Part V (defining the "robot exclusion protocol" and how it recently has
been utilized).
150. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (2000) (find
ing unauthorized access where the defendant accessed facts in violation of the plaintiff's
stated terms of use and Robot Exclusion Standard).
151. Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. Lj. 475, 475 (2002).
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sions. 152 When such "approval" is necessary, it usually consists of a
party clicking on a box marked "I Agree," oftentimes without even
being presented with the numerous restrictions to which the user has
apparently agreed. 153
These provisions may prohibit a party from utilizing a software
robot to gather data made publicly available by the owner of the web
site,154 or they may restrict a visitor from copying uncopyrightable in
formation for any sort of commercial purpose, despite the fact that
the copyright laws would clearly allow the party to engage in such con
duct.155 However, courts have not hesitated to enforce contracts of
this nature. 156
For example, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the plaintiff website
owner imposed conditions on the access to and end use of its domain
name registrant contact information database. 157 As discussed above,
as part of its obligation as an accredited domain name registrar, Regis
ter. com was required to provide to the public an online, interactive
database containing the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all
customers who register domain names through its services. 158 Be
cause the data contained therein consisted solely of facts, the informa
tion was not protectable under copyright law. 159 Normally, this would
allow a party to freely copy, utilize, and distribute this data. 160
However, Register.com published terms and conditions gov
erning the use of its domain name registrant database on the home
page of its Internet website. 161 These provisions prohibited a party
from using the contact information to engage in any commercial ad
vertising or solicitations via direct mail, electronic mail, or by tele
phone. 162 Additionally, the terms provided that the user, by
152. ld.
153. !d.
154. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dis
cussing Register.com's terms and conditions for users, which prohibit the use of "high
volume, automated, electronic processes that apply to Register.com").
155. See supra notes 3842 and accompanying text (explaining that copyright law does
not protect facts because they do not meet the originality requirement).
156. See, e.g., &gister.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 245-48 (granting Register.com an in
junction based on its breach of contract claim).
!57. !d. at 242-44.
158. Id. at 241-42.
159. See supra notes 38-56 (discussing the scope of copyright law).
160. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,348 (1990) (noting that
facts are uncopyrightable public information).
161. R£gister.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. at 242-43.
162. Id. at 242-43. The terms and conditions read as follows:
By submitting a ... query, you agree that you will use this data only for lawful
purposes and that under no circumstances wi!l you use this data to: (l) allow,
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submitting a request for information from the database, agreed to be
bound by the terms and conditions of use. 163
Verio conceded that its use of the contact information for mar
keting purposes conflicted with Register.com 's posted restrictions. 164
However, Verio claimed that the terms and conditions were unen
forceable, as it had never manifested assent to them. 165 Additionally,
Verio argued that even under Register.com's policies, it was entitled
to access the contact information database. 166 As such, Verio argued
that its conduct could not be deemed "unauthorized" and, conse
quently, it could not be in violation of the CFAA. 167
The court disagreed, finding that Verio was in fact bound by the
terms and conditions posted by Register.com on its Internet site. 168
The court began its discussion by acknowledging that "Register.com's
terms of use are clearly posted on its website." 169 Additionally, the
court noted that the concluding paragraph of the terms and condi
tions stated that "by submitting this query, you agree to abide by these
terms." 170 The court held that "in light of this sentence at the end of
Register.com's terms of use, there can be no question that by proceed
ing to submit a [request for information], Verio manifested its assent
to be bound." 171 The court found it irrelevant that Verio was not
asked to click on an icon indicating that it accepted the terms, as
Verio did not argue that it was unaware of them. 172
The court ruled that because Verio had retrieved contact infor
mation for the purpose of solicitation in violation of Register.com's
posted policies, Verio had violated the CFAA. 173 The court held that
even ifVerio's initial access to the contact information database could
enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial
advertising or solicitations via direct mail, electronic mail, or by telephone; or (2)
enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that apply to Register.com
(or its syStems). The compilation, repackaging, dissemination or other Use of this
data is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Register.com.
Register.com reseiVes the right to modifY these tenns at any time. By submitting
this query, you agree to abide by these terms.

!d.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

!d.
!d. at 245.
!d. at 246.
/d. at 252-53.

It!.
!d. at 248.
Jd.
/d.

!d.
/d.

ld. at 252-53.
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be classified as "authorized," such access would still be rendered "un
authorized," because Verio knew that the data it obtained would be
used for a purpose prohibited by the terms and conditions of Register.
com's Internet site. 174 The court did not address the fact that the
information at issue was uncopyrightable or that it had been made
publicly available by Register.com. Instead, the court found that Reg
ister.com was entitled to a preliminary injunction based upon its
CFAA claim and ordered Verio to comply with all of Register.com's
website policies. 175
The enforcement of contracts protecting noncopyrightable infor
mation, similar to the one at issue in Register.com has generated a sub
stantial amount of controversy among academic commentators. 176
Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, in
part because contracts are only one of the methods by which website
owners have been able to define unauthorized conduct under the
CFAA, it is worth noting some of the predominate issues involved in
this debate. These generally fall into the categories of assent, copy
right preemption, and unconscionability.

174. ld. at 253.
175. Id. at 252-53, 255. The injunction provided, in relevant part, that Verio was prohib
ited from engaging in the following activities:
[1] Accessing Register.com's computers and computer networks in any man
ner, including, but not limited to, by software programs perfonning multiple,
automated, successive queries, provided that nothing in this Order shall prohibit
Verio from accessing Register.com's WHOIS database in accordance with the
terms and conditions thereof; and
[2] Using auy data currently in Verio's possession, custody or control, that
using its best efforts, Verio can identify as having been obtained from Register.
com's computers and computer networks to enable the transmission of unsolic
ited commercial electronic mail, telephone calls, or direct mail to the individuals
listed in said data . . . .
ld. at 255.
176. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure
of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 395-41 (1999) (discussing copyright law and the
scope of the public domain); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated
Intellectual Property Rights: &conciling Frtedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 875, 884-913 (1999) (examining the practice of contracting around
federal intellectual property law); Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The &lation Be
tween Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 827, 828-89 (1998) (ex
ploring the relationship between contract and copyright law); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Copyright Pr-eemption AftcrtheProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 53,
77-90 (1997) (discussing the competing interests involved in freedom of contract and preo
ervation of the public domain).

MARYLAND LAw REVIEw

342

a.

[VoL. 63:320

Assent.-It is black letter law that in order for a contract

to be enforceable, a party must have assented to its terms. 177 How
ever, gone are the days when parties sit down and negotiate each and
every tenn of an agreement. The vast majority of contracts today are
standard fonn agreements. Courts have generally enforced these
types of contracts, balancing the ideal of fully infonned assent against
the realties of the marketplace in which obtaining such assent is pro
hibitively expensive, particularly with mass-market transactions. 178
However, commentators have expressed concern that actual as
sent has become increasingly fictitious with some of the new forms of
standardized agreements that have emerged in the marketplace. 179 It
is difficult to see how a website visitor that has not provided any posi
tive acceptance to the site's tenns and conditions can be deemed to
have consented to them through the mere use of the Internet site. 180
But recent court decisions have facilitated the enforcement of such
contracts. 181 Additionally, the passage of the Uniform Computer ln
fonnation Transaction Act (UCITA) 182 by some state legislatures 183
has provided additional validation. 184
177. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2003). A contract"s existence depends on mutual intent to
agree. !d.
178. O"Rourke, supra note 18, at 623-24.
179. See id. at 624-65 (noting that in the electronic context "not all users will read the
tenns, making any assent less than fully informed").
180. See id. at 624 (encouraging the adoption of a rule requiring website operators, in
order for their tenns of use to be enforceable, to provide the terms before allowing access
to the website).
181. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding
arbitration clause in contract included with mail-order computer, despite the fact that the
consumer could not view the agreement until after the item arrived); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenbcrg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that software distributed with
boilerplate license agreement, often called a "shinkwrap contract," is enforceable despite
the fact that consumers cannot even view the contract until after the purcha.se has been
made); M.A Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Wash.
2000) (holding that an arbitration clause in a "shrink-wrap" licensing agreement was en
forceable); Westendorfv. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 16, 2000) (enforcing an arbitration provision contained within a standard form con
tract accompanying a computer purchased by mail).
182. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) is a model con
tract law for software licenses and other computer information transactions. See Pamela
Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, Huw Tensions Betwem Intellectual Property Policy and UCITA Are
Likely to be Re.solved, in £CoMMERCE: STRATEGIES FOR SuccESs IN THE DIGITAL EcoNOI\1Y 741,
746-53 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 1999) (providing an overview of UCITA).
183. See, e.g., Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 22-106 (2002) (adopting UCITA in
Maryland).
184. The provisions of UCITA have been heavily criticized for making it even easier for
courts to find that a party has assented to contracrual provisions. See Samuelson & Opsahl,
supra note 182, at 752-53 (noting that under UCITA contracts can be formed without a
"signature, specific language or any specific con<;Juct," thereby significantly expanding the
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Preemption.-Even if the assent hurdle is cleared, a web

site owner seeking enforcement of a contract that provides protection
beyond that granted by the Copyright Act may still face a preemption
challenge. 185 Preemption may be statutorily or constitutionally
based. 186 Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides that "all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by"
federal copyright law. 187 Therefore, a state law cause of action is pre
empted by the Copyright Act if the rights asserted under it are
"equivalent" to those protected by the Copyright Act, and the work
involved falls within the "subject matter" protected by the Copyright
Act. 188 To the extent a state law. contains an "extra element" not
found in copyright law, courts generally will hold that the state law is
not preempted by the Copyright Act. 189
Many websites, including the one involved in Register. com contain
terms and conditions that prohibit the use of all information con
tained on the site for any sort of commercial purpose, including un
copyrightable facts. 190 However; if the data at issue is not entitled to
copyright protection, the Copyright Act allows the information to be
freely copied and utilized for even commercial purposes. 191 By at
tempting to restrict rights granted by the Copyright Act through con
tract law, website owners are arguably displacing the carefully
balanced provisions of the Copyright Act and, in its place, substituting
their own privately legislated intellectual property laws. 192 As such,
commentators have argued that enforcement under state law may be

concept of assent). At the time of this writing, UCITA had been adopted by Maryland and
Virginia, and legislation had been introduced in Arizona, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire,
New jersey, Oregon, Texas, and the District of Columbia.
185. See, e.g., Koda!fek v. MTV Networks, Inc., I 52 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)_(hold
ing that the Copyright Act preempts state law where (1) the rights asserted by the plaintiff
under state law are equivalent, and (2) the work in question is covered within the subject
matter of the Copyright Act).
186. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyber>pace: Drawing Burlier> in a Virtual Wurld, 82
MI>JN. L. REv. 609, 694 (1998).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
188. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (cit
ing Kodalkk, 152 F.3d at 1212).
189. See Mayer v. josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (discussing the "extra element" test for preemption).
190. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (delineating the "fair use" policy).
192. O'Rourke, supra note 186, at 694-97 (discussing the conflict between the use of
contractual use-restriction provisions and the Copyrig_ht Act).
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preempted to the extent that these contracts giVe website owners
more rights than copyright law provides. 193
However, courts have not been particularly receptive to this line
of reasoning. 194 Instead courts have found that these contracts are
not preempted because they contain an "extra element," namely the
promises of each of the parties to the agreement. 195 In ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 196 the leading case on the subject of section 301 copyright
preemption, the court distinguished contractual rights and copyright
rights by stating that "[c]ontracts ... generally affect only their par
ties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create exclu
sive rights." 197
But even if a contractual provision survives section 301 preemp
tion, it still may be constitutionally preempted. 198 A contractual term
may be constitutionally preempted if its enforcement would "stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress" in enacting a particular statute. 199 Website owners fre
quently include a provision in the terms and conditions that any use
of software robots to gather information on the Internet site is prohib
ited. 200 There is no copyright right to employ software robots, there
fore, relinquishing one's ability to use one would not implicate an
"equivalent right." 201 However, enforcement of the prohibition would
remove a method by which a website visitor could exercise its right to
copy uncopyrightable information. 202 The fact that the website owner
would alternatively allow the Internet site's content to be manually

193. See id. at 687 (noting that in the Internet context "[b]oilerplate notices against
linking may be ... preempted by federal copyright law"); Elkin-Karen, supra note 12, at
200 ("A license that restricts use of (otherwise unprotected) information could be pre
empted under copyright law.") (footnote omitted).
194. See Hill v. yateway 2000, Inc.. 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (ho\ding that
purchasers were bound by a contract not seen until they opened the box containing their
purchase); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that contractual provisions were not preempted by the Copyright Act).
195. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454-55.
196. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
197. /d. at 1454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. See O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 626 (discussing the application of constitutional
preemption).
199. /d. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
200. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (discussing
eBay's "User Agreement").
201. O'Rourke, supra note 107, at 2000. The Copyright Act protects rights that are
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright." 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (a) (2000).
202. O'Rourke, supra note 107, at 2000.
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indexed may not necessarily save the software robot restriction from
preemption. 203

c. Unconscionability.-Another potential argument for the
invalidation of restrictions such as those found in Register. com is that
they are unconscionable. Traditionally, a term is defined as "uncon
scionable" if it is unduly harsh, commercially unreasonable, or grossly
unfair given the existing circumstances?04 However, some commen
tators have suggested a more refined "public-interest unconscionabil
ity" doctrine in which standard form contracts that contain terms that
impede competition or undermine present or future public-interest
uses of information should not be enforced. 205 Terms and conditions
that prevent software robots from accessing and utilizing non-copy
rightable information may satisfY either test of unconscionability. 206
Requiring all website visitors to consent to such a prohibition before
being permitted to access or use otherwise unprotectable information
arguably rises to the level of being "unduly harsh" or "commercially
unreasonable. "207 This is due to the fact that these types of contrac
tual restrictions look less like a means of protecting a website owner's
Intemet site and more like an attempt to prevent competition. 208 Fur
thermore, as competition is essential to protecting consumers, 209 en
forcement of a contractual provision that hinders it is not in the
public's best interest. 210
2. "Traditional" Contracts.-It is not just mass market licenses
that have formed the basis for CFAA claims. In EF Cultural Travel BV
v. Explorica, Inc., 211 the First Circuit held that an employee's confiden
203. /d. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Cralt Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160, 167
(1989)). The Bonito Court held that a Florida statute prohibiting one method of duplicat
ing boat hulls was preempted by the federal Patent AcL Bonito, 489 U.S. at 168.
204. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1524-25 (6th ed. 1990) (defining unconscionability as a
"doctrine under which courts may deny enforcement of unfair or oppressive contracts");
see also Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (applying the doctrine of
unconscionability to a contract for the sale of chattels).
205. See, e.g., Reichman & Franklin, supra note 176, at 929-32 (proposing the doctrine of
public-interest unconscionability).
206. See id. at 931 (explaining that contract tenns that unreasonably deviate from com
mercially accepted practices are unconscionable).
207. O'Rourke, supra note 107, at 2000.
208. See id. (stating that " [ t) he blanket exclusion of spiders employed by shopbots may
hamper competition by restricting the flow of pricing information").
209. See supra Part IV (discussing consumer benefits from competition).
210. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 182 (asserting that" [a] noncompetitive market of
virtual gatekeepers could compromise open access and cause inefficiencies in electronic
commerce").

211. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
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tiality agreement defined the contours of "authorized" conduct for
the purposes of a CFAA action. 212 However, as discussed below, the
court's decision appears to be erroneous.
The plaintiff, EF Cultural Travel BV (EF), has been in business
for more than thirty-five years and is the world's largest private stu
dent travel organization. 213 In early 2000, the defendant, Explorica,
Inc. (Explorica), was formed and began to compete with EF in the
field of global tours for high school students. 214 Several of EF's for
mer employees were hired by Explorica, including Philip Gormley,
the former vice president of information strategy at EF, who became
the vice president of Explorica. 215
Gormley believed that the best way to compete with EF would be
to charge less for equivalent travel packages. 216 In order to do this,
Gormley needed to obtain the prices for each of EF's tours. 217
Gormley considered several ways to obtain EF's prices, but ultimately
decided that the most efficient method would be to use a software
robot to gather the non-copyrightable information from EF's publicly
accessible website.218 Explorica hired its Internet consultant to design
the program and then used the program twice, first to retrieve the
2000 tour prices and then the 2001 prices. 219 EF did not, however,
suffer any computer slowdowns or loss of data as a result of Explor
ica's robotic activity. 220
Upon learning of Explorica's actions, 221 EF filed suit against Ex
plorica alleging violations of the CFAA and sought a preliminary in
junction barring Explorica from using its software robot on EF's
website. 222 The district court granted the injunction on the grounds
that the manner in which Explorica accessed EF's website was "unau
thorized," as it likely violated a confidentiality agreement between
212. ld. at 583-85. ·
213. !d. at 579.
214. !d.
215. Id.
216. ld.
217. !d.
218. Id. Gormley also considered the following methods of gathering EF's prices: (I)
"[M]anually keying in the information from EF's brochures and other printed materials;
[ (2)] ... [U]sing a scanner to record the information; [ (3}] ... [M]anually searching ...
EF"s website" for the price of each tour offered by EF. ld.
219. !d. at 579-80.
220. !d. at 584.
221. The court noted that "[t]he development arid use of the scraper [Explorica"s
software robot] came to light about a year and a half later during [unre1ated] state--court
litigation." /d. at 580.
222. !d.
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Gormley and EF. 223 Explorica appealed the decision to the First
Circuit. 224
In affirming the district court's decision, the appellate court first
reviewed the terms of the confidentiality agreement at issue. 225 The
agreement provided that Gormley was not to disclose or use any "Con
fidential or Proprietary Information." 226 This term was defined as
"any trade or business secrets or confidential information of EF" or
"any technical, business, or financial information, the use or disclo
sure of which might reasonably be construed to be contrary to the
interests of EF." 227 The court held that the record contained two
communications from Gormley to Explorica's Internet consultant that
"seem[ed] to rely on information about EF to which he was privy only
because of his employment there." 228
First, the court pointed to an e-mail from Gormley to the Internet
consultant in which he inquired if a member of the company could
write a software robot program and also stated that he would be availa
ble to work with whomever would design it. 229 The second communi
cation consisted of another e-mail from Gormley to the Internet
consultant providing a link to the webpage on EF's publicly accessible
Internet site that contained an interactive database that a website visi
tor could use to obtain EF's tour prices. 230 The information gathered
223. ld. at 580-82. Incredibly, the district court also held that EF's use of a copyright
symbol on one of the pages of its website, along with a link directing users with questions to
contact the company, provided notification that use of a software robot was unauthorized.
fd_ at 580. The district court stated that it furnished a "clear statement [that] should have
dispelled any notion a reasonable person may have had that the 'presumption of open
access' applied to information on EF's website." ld. On appeal, the First Circuit did not
review this basis for finding that Explorica had engaged in "unauthorized" conduct in vio
lation of the CFAA ld. at 582.
Additionally, the appellate court did not review the district court's finding that EF
utilized "technical restraints" to notify Explorica that software robots were prohibited on
EF's Internet site. /d. The opinion does not specify the types of "technical restraints" EF
used, but this most likely included use of the software robot exclusion protocol. See infra
Part V (providing a discussion of the use of this mechanism).
224. EF Cultural Travel BV, 274 F.3d at 578.
225. ld. at 582.
226. !d.
227. ld_
228. fd_
229. ld. The e-mail stated: "[m]ight one of the team be able to write a program to
automatically extract prices ... ? I could work with him/her on the specification." /d.
230. ld. Gormley's e-mail provided as follows:
Here is a link to the page where you can grab EF's prices. There are two impor
tant drop down menus on the right .... \Vith the lowest one you select one of
about 150 tours.*** You then select your origin gateway from a list of about 100
domestic gateways (middle drop down menu). \Vhen you select your origin gate
way a page with a couple of tables comes up. One table. has 1999·2000 prices and
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from this page included various tour codes, which EF claimed were
confidential. 231
The court held that these e-mails provided "ample evidence that
Gormley provided Explorica proprietary information about the struc
ture of the website and the tour codes" despite the court's acknowl
edgement that "gathering manually the various codes through
repeated searching and deciphering of the URLs 232 theoretically may
be possible." 233 According to the court, further evidence that the tour
codes were confidential was illustrated by the fact that "[a]n unin
formed reader would regard the tour codes as nothing but gibber
ish."234 Moreover, the court noted that "[a]lthough the codes can be
correlated to the actual tours and destination points, the codes stand
ing alone need to be 'translated' to be meaningfu1." 235 The court
concluded by finding that "Explorica's wholesale use of EF's travel
codes to facilitate gathering EF's prices from its website reeks of use
and indeed, abuse-of proprietary information that goes beyond any
authorized use of EF's website." 236 As such, the court held that Ex
plorica's actions were "unauthorized" and that the district court's issu
ance of an injunction for violation of the CFAA was proper. 237
The court's reasoning in this case appears to be misguided. De
spite the court's conclusion that Gormley transferred proprietary in
formation to its Internet consultant,238 it seems that Gormley
provided nothing more than the Internet address on which the pub
licly available database was located and instructions for its use. 239 This
certainly does not resemble the type of information that only an emthe other has 200{}-2001 prices. * * * On a high speed connection it is possible to
move quickly from one price table to the next by hitting backspace and then the
down arrow.
Id.
231. Id.
232. URL is the acronym for "uniform resource locator," the global address of docu
ments and other resources on the Internet. Id. at 583 n.l3. For example, the URL for
book-seller Barnes and Noble's website home page is "http://barnesandnoble.com," while
the URL for the page listing the results of a search for all books on "computer hacking" is:
http: I I search. barnesandnoble .com/booksearch/ results.asp?WRD=computer+ hacking&
userid=**********" (author's actual ten digit user identification number removed from
URL and replaced with asterisks).
233. Id. at 583.
234. Id.
235. ld.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 58~4.
238. Id. at 583.
239. Id. at 582 (referring to the e-mail from Gormley to Explorica's Internet consultant
in which Gormley provided the link to EF's prices).
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ployee of EF would be privy to, instead it would appear that any indi
vidual who was remotely computer savvy could locate EF's publicly
available tour price database on its Internet site and navigate through
it to obtain the cost of each tour without much difficulty. 240
Additionally, the fact that the average website visitor would not
make use of the tour codes provided on the website, 241 does not trans
form this uncopyrightable data into proprietary information. Al
though Gormley may have been better able to organize and utilize the
tour price information gathered from EF's website with knowledge of
the tour codes, nothing in the opinion indicates that these codes or
the tour prices were not available to members of the general public.
It would therefore seem difficult to characterize this information as
"confidential" or "proprietary."
It appears that EF's CFAA claim was a thinly veiled attempt to
prevent legitimate competition. 242 Explorica's software robots were
unwelcome visitors, not because they caused harm to EF's computer
system, but because the information they gathered allowed Explorica
to compete more effectively against EF in the high school global tours
market. 243 It is hard to see how utilizing that which looks like publicly
accessible information runs afoul of Gormley's employment agree
ment.244 It seems that the only real injury EF may have suffered as a
result of Explorica's conduct was harm to its bottom line.

3. Robot Exclusion ProtocoL-As discussed above, although a
software robot utilizes the same web protocols as an individual in ini
tially accessing information from an Internet site, they gather informa
tion from a website in a different manner. 245 As a result, while all
"traditional" visitors to a website may be asked to click "I Agree" to an
Internet site's terms and conditions, a software robot's presence may
not activate such a request from the website. 246 Further complicating
matters for a website 'owner seeking to prohibit software robots from'
accessing and utilizing information from its Internet site, a software
240. See id. at 579 (noting that tour information could be acquired by manually search
ing EF's website).
241. /d. at 583.
242. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 181-82 (drawing similar conclusions about eBay's
CFAA claim in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
243. See id. (noting that the plaintiff in eBay was similarly motivated to "preserve its domi·
nance in the online auction industry..).
244. See EF Cultural Travel BV, 274 F.2d at 582-83 (describing the information accessed
by Gormley and the terms of the confidentiality agreement between Gormley and EF).
245. See supra Part IV; see also O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570.71 (describing the use of
automated software tools to extract data).
246. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570.71.
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robot may never actually view the webpage that contains the Internet
site's prohibitions against these electronic agents. 247
Most software robots will, however, see a specially formulated "ro
bots. txt" file upon accessing a website. 248 This document provides di
rectives indicating which parts of the Internet site the owner does not
want the robot visiting and is known as the "Robot Exclusion Proto
col."249 But nothing prevents a software robot from ignoring these
instructions and crawling the entire site. 250 In fact, the Robot Exclu
sion Protocol creators designed it to be a voluntary standard. 251
Regardless, it appears courts may be inclined to give the protocol
legal effect. 252 In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., the court held that
eBay "explicitly notifies automated visitors that their access is not per
mitted."253 The coun noted that eBay utilized the Robot Exclusion
Protocol to inform software robots that access to its website was unau
thorized. 254 Although the court's decision was in the context of a tres
passing claim, it would seem that this same analysis would be
applicable to eBay's CFAA claim as well. 25-'
Once again, however, enforcement of the Robot Exclusion Proto
col gives the website owner the power to exclude anyone from its In
ternet site that it deems undesirable. 256 There is no requirement that
the protocol be drafted in such a way to limit its application to robotic
activity that could cause actual damage to a computer system. 257 In
stead, it can be used to prevent software robots from accessing and

247. ld. at 572-73.
248. Koster, supra note 104. Koster helped develop the Robot Exclusion Protocol and
maintains it to this day. Luh, supra note 98.
249. Koster, supra note 104.
250. ld.; Luh, supra note 98.
251. Koster, supra note 104.
252. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal.
2000); see also EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 580-81 (1st Cir. 2001)
(discussing the district court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction on a CFAA claim
based in part on its finding that the defendant had "bypassed technical restrictions embed
ded in the website"-most likely referring to the Robot Exclusion Protocol).
253. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
254. ld. at 1061.
255. ld.; see also Dan L. Burk, The Trouhli! with Trespass, 4]. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27,
28-32 (2000) (discussing courts' me of the trespass cause of action in disputes over com
puter and Internet access).
256. Luh, supra note 98 (stating that the "Robot Exclusion [Protocol] ... lets Web site
owners tell robots where to go and where not to go on their sites").
257. See id. (noting that the Robot Exclusion Standard is not really a "standard," as it is
not mandatory).
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utilizing factual information on an Internet site that is not otherwise
protectable, to the detriment of the general public. 258

4. Direct Communication.-A website owner seeking to control ac
cess to and the use of information on its Internet site is not limited to
contracts or use of the Robot Exclusion Protocol to notify software
robots that they are unwelcome. 259 Courts have held that website
owners can use ·a number of more direct methods to notify a specific
party that their electronic data gathering is not permitted. 260 For ex
ample, in eBay, the court found that eBay had contacted defendant
Bidder's Edge by telephone and letter demanding that it cease any
further robotic activity. 261 The court held that it was therefore irrele
vant that Bidder's Edge may not have assented to the terms and condi
tions of eBay's website that prohibited the use of software robots, as
Bidder's Edge had been "repeatedly and explicitly notified [that] its
use of eBay's computer system was unauthorized." 262
Additionally, in Register. com, Inc. u. Verio, Inc., the court ruled that
Register.com's Internet site's terms of use may not have specifically
forbidden the use of search robots. 263 However, the court still held
that Verio had been notified that such use was prohibited. 264 The
court found that it was "clear since at least the date this lawsuit was
filed that Register.com d[id] not consent to Verio's use of a search
robot," and that Verio was "on notice that its search robot [was] un
welcome."265 The court ruled that "Verio's future use of a search
robot to access the database exceed[ed] the scope of Register.com's
consent" and would be unauthorized. 266 As such, the court issued an
injunction on Register.com's CFAA claim, prohibiting Verio from ac
258. See id. (citing an industry expert who argues that use of the Robot Exclusion stan
dard as a "no trespassing sign" could chill the free flow of information on the lnternet).
259. See, e.g., eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (referring to eBay's contacting of Bid
der's Edge by phone and by letter to notify it that robot use was prohibited on eBay's
website).
260. See id.
261. /d. at 1062.
262. /d. at 1068, 1070.
263. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Regis
ter.com 's terms and conditions required a party utilizing its contact information database
to agree that it would not "use this data to ... enable high volume, automated, electronic
processes that apply to Register.com (or its systems)." The court also found that
"(a]lthough Verio uses an automated process to collect the ... data it does not then use
the collected data to enable an automated process[.]" /d. (emphasis omitted). Instead,
.. [o]nce Verio's software robot secures the ... information from Register.com's systems, it
has completed its automated process with respect to Register.com's systems." /d.
264. /d.
265. /d.
266. /d. at 249, 251.
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cessing its publicly accessible online database by means of a software
robot.267

C.

"Loss"

A civil action plaintiff stating a CFAA claim must not only be able
to prove that a defendant has engaged in prohibited conduct, but
must also prove that it has suffered sufficient harm. 268 Under the
CFAA, a plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant's conduct
has resulted in a Joss of $5000 by the plaintiff. 269 Prior to the 2001
USA Patriot Act amendments, however, there was some uncertainty as
to when the statutory minimum was applicable and how it should be
calculated. 270 This was due in large part to a combination of organiza
tional problems and statutory ambiguities inherent in prior versions
of the CFAA. 271
Earlier versions of the Act provided that in order to bring a civil
action, a plaintiff must have suffered "damage or loss." 272 The CFAA
defined "damage" as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of
data, a program, a system, or information" that causes loss aggregating
at least $5000 in value during any one-year period to one or more
individuals. 273 However, the term "Joss" was not defined.
267. !d. at 252.
268. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003) (requiring CFAA plaintiff to demon
strate loss of at least $5000).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Supp. 2003). Section (g) provides in part: "A civil action for a
violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set
forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a) (5) (B)." /d. Section (a) (5) (B)
(i) provides: "loss to 1 or more persons during any !-year period (and, for purposes of an
investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss
resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers)
aggregating at least $5,000 in value." /d.§ 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).
270. See infra notes 274-288 (discussing cases in whicl) courts construed the meaning of
"loss" under the CFAA).
271. See, e.g., Andreano, supra note 65, at 86 (discussing problems associated with the
1984 CFAA).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994 & Supp. 1996) ("Any person who suffers damage or loss
by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.").
273. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (8) (A) (1994). The term damage was also defined as "any im
pairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information, that
(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical examina
tion, diagnosis, treaunent, or care of one or more individuals;
(C) causes physical injury to any person; or
(D) threatens public health or safety."
/d. § l030(e)(8)(b)-(d).
However, in the context of website owners attempting to prevent their competitors
from accessing and utilizing information contained on their Internet sites, only Section
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As a result, a number of cases arose regarding the issue of
whether the $5000 statutory minimum applied to "loss" or only "dam
age."274 Civil action plaintiffs argued that, although the $5000 thresh
old may be applicable to cases involving "damage," a party who has
suffered "loss" should not be required to prove that it met the statu
tory minimum. 275 Most courts, however, were not receptive to this
line of reasoning, and held that the $5000 statutory minimum applied
to civil actions regardless of whether the harm was pled as "loss" or
"damage." 276

Prior to the 2001 amendments, courts also struggled with deter
mining the types of harm that could be included in calculating the
$5000 statutory minimum. For example, could the costs of investigat
ing any possible harm caused by a defendant's conduct be included?
Additionally, what about computer time lost by a plaintiff as a result of
repairs needed because of a defendant's actions? Or were only the
costs specified in the definition of "damage" allowed, namely, expend
itures directly related to any impairment to the actual computer sys
tem or the availability of data?
Courts faced with this issue differed widely over the types of harm
that could be included in determining whether the monetary thresh
old had been met. 277 Others avoided this statutory ambiguity by ar
(A) ("causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any !-year period to one or
more individuals") is applicable. See id. § 1030(e)(8)(A).
274. See infra notes 275-276 and accompanying text (outlining cases demonstrating this
conflict).
275. See, e.g., In re DoubleC!ick Inc. Privacy Litig., !54 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (noting the plaintiffs argument that "loss" is distinct from "damage" under
§ 1030(g)).
276. See id. at 522 (holding that any loss actionable under the CFM is subject to the
Act's damage minimum); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1159 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (finding that the statute is ambiguous on the [ssue of whether loss is subject to
the $5000 statutory minimum, but that the context of the statute requires an inclusion of
"loss" within the harm threshold); Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d
667, 678 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that the $5000 statutory minimum is applicable regard
less of whether harm is pled as "loss" or "damage"); In reintuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp.
2d 1272, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that in order to bring a civil action, a plaintiff must
suffer "damage" as defined under the Act and interpreting "loss" to mean irreparable
damage).
277. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584.85 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding that diagnostic measures taken by the plaintiff to assess the defendant's access to
its website could be included in calculating the $5000 statutory threshold); In re Intui~ 138
F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (declaring that the definition of loss is limited to "irreparable damage"
and that a more expansive definition would render the tenn "damage" superlluous); In re
DoubleClick Inc., !54 F. Supp. 2d at 521-22 (citing legislative history for support of its deci·
sian that "loss" can include more than just the cost of actual repairs to a computer system);
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126-27
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (adopti~g an expansive definition of "loss" to meet the monetary
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guably stretching the logical boundaries of the facts and law in order
to find that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient "damage" as defined by
the Act, namely, harm to computer data or the system itself. 278 For
example, as discussed above, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the
plaintiff website owner brought suit against one of its competitors for
utilizing a software robot to collect non-copyrightable data contained
on its publicly accessible website. 279 The defendant's conduct did not,
however, cause the plaintiff's system to shutdown or result in the cor
ruption of any data. 280
In an attempt to prove that the $5000 threshold had been met,
the plaintiff submitted the declaration of its Vice President for Tech
nology, Robert Gardos, who estimated that the defendant's activities
had resulted in the diminishment of 2.3% of the plaintiff's system re
sources. 281 But during discovery, it was determined that the plaintiff's
Vice President had not taken measurements of either the capacity of
the plaintiff's computer system or the portion of that capacity that was
consumed by the defendant's search robots. 282 Instead, the plaintiff's
Vice President admitted that the numbers he used were "all rough
estimates" in arriving at his conclusion that the defendant's search
robots occupied a certain percentage of the plaintiff's system
capacity. 283
Despite the court's acknowledgement that the plaintiff's vice
president's estimations had been "thoroughly undercut," 284 the court
still found that the $5000 threshold had been met. 285 The court
stated that "[z]fthe strain on [the plaintiff's] resources generated by
robotic searches becomes large enough, it could cause [the plaintiff's]
computer systems to malfunction or crash. Such a crash would satisfY
[the CFAA's] threshold requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate
$5000 in economic damages." 286 Based on this mere possibility of fu
ture harm, the court determined that the plaintiff had satisfied the
threshold); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., I26 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252 n.l2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that lost goodwill or business could be included in calculation of the statutory
minimum absent the impairment or unavailability of data or systems).
278. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc., I26 F. Supp. 2d at 252 (noting that harm based on the
potential for future harm can be included in the calculation of damages under § I030(g)).
279. !d. at 243-44.
280. !d. at 249-50.
281. !d. at 249.
282. Id. at 249-50.
283. !d.
284. ld. at 249.
285. !d. at 252.
286. !d. (emphasis added).
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statutory minimum level of damage necessary for a CFAA claim. 287
The court went on to issue an injunction that prohibited the defen
dant's software robots from searching the plaintiff's publicly accessible
website. 288
The 2001 amendments to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
did not remove the $5000 threshold, but instead arguably made it eas
ier to meet. 289 The usA Patriot Act290 resolved the statutory ambigu
ity that had perplexed the courts regarding how the statutory
minimum should be calculated by defining "loss" and providing that
all loss should be included in determining whether the statutory mini
mum is met. 291 Currently, the CFAA defines loss as "any reasonable
287. ld.
288. ld.
289. The 2001 amendments made clear that all parties bringing a civil action must
prove that they suffered a $5000 loss except in those cases that involve (I) "the modifica
tion or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination,
diagnosis, treatment, or care of I or more individuals"; [2] .. physical injury to any person";
[3] "a threat to public health or safety"; or (4) "damage affecting a computer system used
by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration ofjustice, national de
fense, or national security." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (B)(ii)-(iv) (Supp. 2003). None of
these exceptions, however, are generally applicable to a case involving a website owner
attempting to prevent parties from accessing and utilizing information contained on its
Internet site.
290. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
291. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814, Jl5 Stat. at 382; 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. 2003). It
should be noted that the 2001 amendments resolved another statutory ambiguity related to
the statutory threshold, namely, whether the $5000 minimum could be satisfied through a
related course of conduct, rather than a single act. The issue arose in a series of class
action suits with courts differing in how the CFAA should be interpreted. See Hayes v.
Packard Bell NEC, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 910,912 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that the CFAA
required an allegation that the defect caused $5000 worth of damage to each protected
computer, not $5000 in the aggregate); Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F.
Supp. 2d 667, 678 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (determining that in order for the statutory minimum
to be met, at least one member of the plai~tiff class must have suffered $5000 in damage,
and if so, any other individual who suffered damage may bring a claim, even if his or her
own damage is less than $5000); ln re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497,
523 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the CFAA only allows damages and losses to "be aggre
gated across victims and over time for a single act"); ln reToys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No.
C-00-2746, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001) (holding that each
plaintiff did not have to suffer damage of $5000 to meet the statutory threshold and that
losses caused by the same type of act by the defendant may be aggregated); ln reAm.
Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (ruling that $5000 statutory
threshold can be aggregated among the various members of the plaintiff class).
The USA Patriot Act amended the CFAA to provide that the $5000 damage threshold
is satisfied through loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting one or more
protected computers for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding
brought by the United States only. 18 U.S.C. § l030(a) (5) (B) (i) (Supp. 2003). The impli
cation therefore appears to be that a single act, not a related course of conduct, must be
alleged by an individual bringing a civil action, as opposed to the government, in order to
meet the statutory loss requirement.
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cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, con
ducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, sys
tem, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any
revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service." 292 The legislative history evinces
Congress's intent behind the expansive definition was to ensure that a
court considers all of a hacking victim's losses when determining
whether the $5000 minimum is satisfied. 293
As a result, the owner of a publicly available website that wants to
completely bar its competitors from accessing and utilizing the infor
mation contained therein, no longer has to sit by and hope that its
claim will be heard by a judge willing to engage in the same analysis
that the Register.com court employed. Instead, website owners them
selves can ensure that they have fulfilled the $5000 statutory thresh
old. All a website owner need do is to hire a firm to conduct a
"damage assessment" following detection of robotic activity. 294 As the
statute expressly provides that all charges related to such an assess
ment are to be included in computing the minimum harm required
to bring a civil suit, 295 the website owner will easily satisfy the first ele
ment of a civil claim under the CFAA regardless of whether the
software robot caused any appreciable harm to its computer system. 296
The requirement of harm under the CFAA has therefore become vir
tually non-existent. For this very reason, a CFAA claim becomes more
attractive to website owners than most other types of claims brought
against their competitors, including trespass to chattels. 297
292. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(ll) (Supp. 2003).
293. 146 GoNG. REc. 510,913, 510,916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
294. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (11) (Supp. 2003) (including among the items that consti
tute a "loss" reasonable costs in conducti_ng damage assessments). This assumes of course
that the damage assessment costs at least $5000. It would appear, however, that this would
more than likely be the case.
295. !d.
296. !d.; see also supra note 293 and accompanying text (noting that the legislative history
of the CFAA indicates an intent to include the full costs to the victim within the definition
of "loss").
297. Over the past few years, the venerable doctrine of trespass has been given new life
in modem cyberspace cases. For example, in eBay, Inc. v. BidderS Edge, Inc., the plaintiff,
eBay brought suit against Bidder's Edge for using a software robot to access and gather
information contained on the plaintiff's Internet site. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (N.D.
Cal. 2000). eBay operates a publicly accessible auction website where sellers of merchan
dise list their wares online and the items are then sold to the highest bidder. ld.
The defendant, Bidder's Edge, does not provide online auction services in direct com
petition \\rith eBay, but instead competes indirectly as an online auction aggregator. /d. at
1061. Bidder's Edge allows an individual interested in locating information about auctions
for a particular type of item to quickly search numerous online auction sites in a single
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PRNATE PROPERlY RIGHTS IN INFORMATION

As the discussion above illustrates, the two elements of a civil ac
tion claim-prohibited conduct and loss-rarely pose much of a hur
dle for a website owner who seeks to prevent its competitors from
accessing and utilizing noncopyrightable information contained on its
website. In many ways, it is even easier for a civil action plaintiff to
prove that the defendant has violated the CFAA's prohibitions than to
prove loss, as plaintiffs have been given surprisingly wide latitude in
defining that which constitutes permissible conduct on their web-

search, as opposed to performing a separate search on the website of each online auction
company. ld. at 1061-62. For example, if someone were interested in bidding on a Sammy
Sosa baseball card, he or she would want to find out where such auctions were occurring,
and more likely than not, the current bid on the baseball card. This data could be ob
tained by visiting the home page of every online auction site and conducting a search on
each one, or by simply conducting one search on the Bidder's Edge site to find out the very
same information. ld. at 1062.
Bidder's Edge uses software robots to compile the data from individual online auction
companies, including the information on eBay's website. /d. One may wonder why eBay
would object to the additional exposure that a site like Bidder's Edge may bring to eBay's
own auctions. The simple fact is that even though eBay may get some publicity, Bidder's
Edge also provides information on eBay's direct competitors, potentially informing a con
sumer about a better deal. /d.
Another reason why eBay disapproved of Bidder's Edge's use of software robots on its
site is that eBay had been attempting to license such a right to crawl its website to others.
Id. In fact, prior to filing the lawsuit, eBay and Bidder's Edge had been engaged in licens
ing negotiations. /d. eBay had even consented to Bidder's Edge's robotic activity while
negotiations for a fonnal licensing agreement were underway. ld. When, however, the
negotiations failed to result in an agreement, Bidder's Edge refused to stop crawling eBay's
site. /d. Soon thereafter, eBay filed suit against Bidder's Edge alleging a variety of state
and federal claims, including common law trespass to chattels and a violation of the CFAA.
ld. eBay then moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Bidder's Edge from acces
sing its Internet site, to which the court noted that "eBay's motion appears to be, in part, a
tactical effort to increase the strength of its license negotiation position and not just a
genuine effort to prevent irreparable harm." Id. at 1064 n.9.
Despite this fact, the court granted the injunction, ruling only on the trespass claim.
Id. In order to prevail on the trespass to chattels claim, eBay had to prove that Bidder's
Edge had intentionally interfered with eBay's possessory interest in the computer system,
and that such conduct had proximately caused damage. /d. at 1069-70. However, eBay's
computer system had not been harmed in any way by Bidder's Edge's robotic activity. Id. at
1064-65. There was no evidence that eBay had suffered any loss of data or that it had
experienced any system crashes or slowdowns. /d.
But the court surprisingly still found that the element of harm had been satisfactorily
demonstrated by eBay. /d. at 1069. The court ruled that if Bidder's Edge's "activity is
allowed to continue unchecked, it would encourage other auction aggTegators to engage
in similar recursive searching of the eBay system such that eBay would suffer irreparable
harm from reduced system performance, system unavailability, or data losses ... /d. at 1066.
Therefore, based on the mere possibility of future harm by unidentified third parties, the
court enjoined Bidder's Edge's robots from crawling eBay's publicly accessible website. Jd.
at I 069, 1073.
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sites. 298 As detailed below, this is due in part to the way in which the
statute was drafted, but also how the courts have interpreted the
CFAA's provisions.

A.

The Constitutional Boundaries of Congressional Power

The original drafters of the CFAA purposely defined the types of
acts that would violate the statute rather broadly. 299 Legislators were
concerned that if they did otherwise, they would have to regularly
amend the CFAA to keep up with the ever changing nature of com
puter crime, owing to advancements in computer technology. 300 Al
though this has proven at times to be an attribute of the statute, it has
also resulted in conduct falling within the literal language of the stat
ute that Congress, arguably, never intended to be regulated by the
Act, such as the access and use of publicly accessible factual
information. 301
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Congress even has the
power to create private property rights in factual information. Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution, also known as the Intellec
tual Property Clause, is the source of Congress's power to enact copy
right legislation. 302 The same clause in the Constitution that allows
Congress to enact copyright legislation to protect "original works of
authorship" also restricts the power of Congress to create exclusive
rights in information. 303 Congress cannot constitutionally recognize
private rights in raw facts. 304 In Graham v. john Deere Co., 305 the Su
preme Court stated that in exercising its powers under the Intellectual
Property Clause, Congress "may not overreach the restraints imposed
298. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 253 (S.O.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that the defendant's use of a software robot constituted unauthorized access
under the CFAA).
299. SeeS. REP. No. 104-357, at 5 (1996) (noting that the original drafters of the CFAA
chose to address the problem of computer crime in a single statute, "rather than identify
ing and amending every potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer
technology").
300. !d.
301. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (holding that
copyright protection does not extend to factual information).
302. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu
sive Right to their respective \Vritings and Discoveries..).
303. See id.; see also Yochai Benkler, Constitutitmal Bounds ofDatahase Protection: 111£ Role of
Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition ofPrivate Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TEcH.
LJ. 535 (~000).
304. !d. at 544 (citing Feis~ 499 U.S. at 351).
305. 383 u.s. 1 (1966).
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by the stated constitutional purpose." 306 The Court further explained
that the Intellectual Property Clause requires Congress to act only in
situations where the extension of an exclusive right promotes
"[i]nnovation, advancement, and . . . add[s] to the sum of useful
knowledge." 307 Congress is therefore prohibited from enacting legis
lation that encloses or burdens access to information or knowledge
already available in the public domain. 308 These limitations reflect a
substantive concern towards granting anyone exclusive rights to con
trol and benefit from ideas or facts. 309
Additionally, Congress cannot bypass the restrictions of the Intel
lectual Property Clause by enacting legislation to protect works that
lack originality under a separate provision of the Constitution, such as
the Commerce Clause. 310 Decisions in cases such as Feist, which are so
heavily based on the constitutionally protected status of public access
to facts and information, in essence would be rendered meaningless if
limitations on Congress's power under the Intellectual Property
Clause could so easily be avoided. 311 The only case to address directly
an Intellectual Property Clause challenge to legislation passed under
the guise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, supports such an
interpretation. 312 In United States v. Moghadam, 313 the Eleventh Circuit
held that there are "circumstances ... in which the Commerce Clause
cannot be used by Congress to eradicate a limitation upon Congress
in another grant of power." 314 In so doing, the court recognized that
Congress's power to create intellectual property-like rights under the
Commerce Clause is limited by the substantive constraints imposed by
the Intellectual Property Clause on the enactment of such rights. 315
These constraints would of course include the requirement of origi
nality, which as explained above, is clearly missing in the case of fac
tual information. 316
Even in the unlikely situation !pat Congress could enact legisla
tion that extends copyright-like protection to factual information in
compliance with the substantive requirements of the Intellectual
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

!d. at 6.
ld.
Benkler, supra note 303, at 543.
ld. at 54:1-44.
ld. at 547-48.
ld. at 545.
Jd. at 546.
175 F.3d 1269 (lith Cir. 1999).
!d. at 1280.
See id. at 128().81; Benkler, supra note 303, at 547-48.
See supra ('art II (discussing the requirements for copyright protection).
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Property Clause, the private rights would still be subject to First
Amendment review. 317 Although the government's intent may not be
to suppress speech, nonetheless such a restriction must be shown to
serve an important state interest and that "the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest." 318 Such a review must take into
account the Supreme Court's conclusion that intellectual property
rights do not conflict with the First Amendment precisely because of
the requirement of originality and the doctrine of fair use. 319 All of
this suggests that courts should review with particular care legislation
that creates exclusive rights in information without adhering to these
fundamental principles. 320
Furthermore, courts could, and in fact should, interpret the
CFAA to avoid such constitutional issues. Under the canon of consti
tutional avoidance, when "a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and
by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to
adopt the latter." 321 The avoidance canon rests upon the judicial
317. Benkler, supra note 303, at 552.
318. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994);
Benkler, supra note 303, at 556, 588-89.
Commentators have differed as to the appropriate level of review to apply to legisla
tion that creates private rights in information, namely whether such a law is content-based,
subjecting it to heightened scrutiny, or content-neutral, thus requiring a lesser, intermedi
ate-level of review. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Ccpyright, 55 VAND. L. REv.
891, 922 (2002) (contending that "copyright laws involve content-based suppression of
speech in the simplest and most direct sense"); Mark A Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Injunctions in Intelkctual Property Ccses, 48 DuKE LJ. 147, 186 (1998) (stating
that it is "incorrect to argue that intellectual property law is content-neutral and should
therefore be subject to laxer rules [, thus,] rclopyright liability turns on the content of
what is published"); Benkler, supra note 303, at 55!>-56 (observing that general informa
tion-control rules are content-neutral, not content-based, as their purpose is the promo
tion of speech generally, not of one particular speech determined by content). In the case
of the CFM it would appear that the law is content-neutral as its protections extend to all
information, not particular types of information. If this position is incorrect and the CFAA
could instead be characterized as a content-based regulation, this would make the starnte
even more constitutionally suspect.
319. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also
Benkler, supra note 303, at 588. The doctrine of fair use in copyright law, for example,
allows an individual to utilize protected portions of another's work without permission, for
such things as public commentary, criticism, or parody. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471
U.S. at 547 n.2.
320. See Benkler, supra note 303, at 588 (discussing constitutional review of legislation
creating rights similar to intellectual property rights).
321. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002) (quoting United States ex rei.
Attorney Gen. v.. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
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branch's "respect for Congress, which [courts assume] legislates in the
light of constitutional limitations." 322 Unfortunately, in recent cases
involving the CFAA, courts instead have construed the Act in such a
way as to make it constitutionally suspect. 323
B.

Delineating the Proprietary Rights of Website Owners

Courts consistently have granted website owners the exclusive
right to regulate the terms upon which access is granted to their pub
licly available Internet sites, as well as the manner in which any non
copyrightable information contained therein is utilized. 324 The typi
cal review of a website owner's terms is best illustrated by the Register.
com court's conclusory statement in connection with its cursory analy
sis of Register.com's CFAA claim: "[B]ecause Register.com objects to
Verio's use of search robots they represent an unauthorized access to
the [contact information] database." 325 Courts evaluating CFAA
claims have not limited the manner in which website owners exercise
the power to exclude. Although such a power may be a fundamental
right of a property owner, 326 it is not absolute. 327 For example, "[t]he
owner of real property has never held an unrestricted right to exclude
strangers or regulate activity upon its premises." 328 Instead, the con
tours of the "relationship[] between landowners and those [either]
seeking entry to or already present" upon another's land have histori
cally been refined by the common Iaw. 329
In fact, the Second Restatement of Torts contains more than
twenty sections [that relate to] "privileged" entries onto land
over the owner's objections. These include: . . . entry to
abate a private nuisance[.] ... entry by a traveler on a public
highway that has become impassable to enter neighboring
322. /d. at 556 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991)).
323. See infra Section V.B (questioning the constitutionality of courts' interpretation of
the CFAA).
324. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (granting an injunction based on unauthorized access where the defendant accessed
eBay's website in violation of the plaintiff's Terms of Use).
325. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
326. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing the right to
exclude as one of the most essential sticks in a property owner's bundle of rights).
327. Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y. U. L.
REv. 633, 667 (1991).
328. /d. Blackstone wrote that the right of property must be exclusive, with every entry
onto land without the owner's permission amounting to a trespass or transgression; he
qualified this statement, however, by listing numerous situations in which entry onto land
was in fact permissible. 3 \VJLLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMEI\.'TARIES *209.
329. Berger, supra note 327, at 667.
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land to continue his or her journey[.] and entry because of
private necessity. 3 ~0
Additionally, in the case of a publicly accessible website, the
owner has already opened its "land" to the general public. 331 This
occurs when the website owner chooses to post uncopyrightable infor
mation to an Internet site that can be viewed by virtually anyone with
an Internet connection. As such, it should be expected that by doing
so, the owner of a publicly accessible website relinquishes some of the
autonomy owners of private property might traditionally enjoy. 332 In
stead, courts have, to some extent, automatically granted legal recog
nition to the restrictions of website owners without considering the
effect on society. 333
Allowing owners of publicly accessible websites to utilize the
CFAA to enforce restrictions placed on access to and use of un
copyrightable information alters the balance of rights struck by copy
right law. Copyright seeks to provide sufficient protection to authors,
so that they have incentives to create. 334 This is balanced, however, by
the primary objective of copyright law, namely to ensure society's ac
cess to copyrighted works in order to "promote the Progress of Sci
ence and useful Arts." 335
However, courts interpreting the CFAA have unconstitutionally
allowed website owners to unilaterally change this balance to their ad
vantage. Website owners have successfully used the statute to enclose
information that belongs in the public domain. 336 In so doing, these
website owners are not just hindering their competitors, but nega
tively affecting society as well. By restricting their competitors' access
to and use of this uncopyrightable information, these website owners
330. /d. The notes to section 197 contain ~£teen examples of private necessity, includ
ing a passerby that enters a private dwelling after hearing screams of distress from inside
and an aviator that is forced to make an emergency landing on another's field. /d. at 667
n.198 (discussing the Section 197 illustrations).
331. S.e Berger, supra note 327, at 652-57 (distinguishing between truly private places,
such as the home, and public spaces, like shopping centers). But see Uoyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (declaring that property does not "lose its private character
merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes"). How
ever, as discussed infra, an argument can be made that the holding of this case should be
narrowly construed.
332. Berger, supra note 327, at 636.
333. See Luh, supra note 98 (suggesting that preventing access to publicly accessible con
tent "threatens the openness of the Internet").
334. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 449 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
335. ld. at 349; U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
336. Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 180-82 (discussing eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ).
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are denying the public the benefits that accrue from increased compe
tition in the marketplace." 37
Furthermore, the enforcement of a website owner's restrictions
on data contained on a publicly accessible website undermines the
balance struck between copyright law and the First Amendment. 338
Utilization of the CFAA to enforce a website owner's restrictions on
publicly available factual information results in the enclosure of the
public domain with a shift in the legal status of information that is not
caused by the absence of government regulation. 339 Instead, it is the
result of a governmental decision that such restrictions are enforced
and it "is no less and no more a regulatory decision than the decision
not to enforce them." 340 As such, the First Amendment's injunction
that "Congress shall make no law" is engaged, and any legislation that
directly regulates information production and exchange must be
shown to serve an important government interest without restricting
substantially more speech than necessary. 341 Although protecting the
integrity of computer systems and confidential information may qual
ify as a laudable legislative goal, the CFAA's provisions as drafted and
interpreted by the courts are significantly more restrictive of speech
than necessary to serve these interests.
The fact that the information collected and utilized by software
robots would most likely be characterized as "commercial speech" as
opposed to "non-commercial speech" does not alter this conclu
sion.342 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that society has a right to
receive commercial speech. 343 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, lnc., 344 the Court stated,
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise econ
omy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggre
337. /d. at 182.
338. See Benkler, supra note 176, at 358 (asserting that "[e]nclosure ... conflicts with the
First Amendment injunction that government not prevent people from using information
or communicating it,.).
339. See id. at 359-60 (discussing enacted and proposed legislation that is part of the
"enclosure movement," including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Article 2B (now
UCITA), and the Collections of Information Anti piracy Act). See generally Alan E. Garfield,
Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 261 (1998).
340. Benkler, supra note 176, at 433.
341. /d. at 394, 413.
342. See Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765-66 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to state restrictions on commercial speech).
343. ld. at 765.
344. 425 u.s. 748 (1976).
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gate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable. 345
Additionally, the Court recognized that
[a]s to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than his interest in the days most urgent politi
cal debate . . . . Therefore, even if the First Amendment
were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that
the free flow of information does not serve that goal. 346
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of
First Amendment interests, the Court has not always held that private
property owners must give way to such rights. 347 In a series of cases,
the Supreme Court has vacillated on the proper balance between First
Amendment rights and private property rights. In Amalgamated Food
Emplayees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, lnc., 348 the Supreme
Court held that picketing on the sidewalks and a parking lot adjacent
to a non-union store by local union members could not be enjoined
by the shopping center because it would be an impermissible con
straint on the protestors' First Amendment rights. 349 But four years
later in Lloyd Curp. v. Tanner, 350 the Court overruled Logan Valley, hold
ing that the First Amendment does not prevent a private shopping
center owner from prohibiting the distribution of leaflets protesting
the Vietnam War on its premises. 351 Lastly, in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 352 the Supreme Court held that a state did not violate
a property owner's First and Fifth Amendment rights by granting indi
viduals the right to enter a privately owned shopping center and
gather petitions. 353
In attempting to reconcile these various opinions, it is important
to keep in mind that in balancing private property interests against
constitutional rights, the Court weighs the effect of any expressive ac
345. ld. at 765.
346. ld. at 763, 765 (footnotes omitted).
347. E.g.. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (holding that a privately
owned shopping center that allowed public access was not dedicated to the public use for
the exercise of political speech).
348. 391 u.s. 308 (1968).
349. ld. at 325.
350. 407 u.s. 551 (1972).
351. ld. at 570.
352. 447 u.s. 74 (1980).
353. !d. at 88; see also Berger, supra note 327, at 633-94 (evaluating Pruneyard and arguing
for recognition of-free speech right in shopping malls).
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tivity, as well as the attendant public benefit. 354 In the case of a web
site owner attempting to use the CFAA to prevent a software robot
from accessing and utilizing uncopyrightable information posted on
an Internet site, the balance clearly should be struck in favor of First
Amendment rights. The software robot is collecting data that is not
constitutionally entitled to protection. 355 It is information that cannot
be owned by any one party, as it is part of the public domain. 356 Addi
tionally, in most instances the data provides the basis for more effec
tive competition against the website owner. 357 Despite the website
owner's views to the contrary, such competition is desirable. 358 As dis
cussed above, the public benefits from a marketplace with increased
options. 359
Furthermore, to the extent that a software robot occupies a por
tion of the website owner's computer server, the intrusion is mini
maJ.360 The software robot does not interfere with a potential
customer's ability to access information on the website owner's In
ternet site, as both entities can do so simultaneously. 361 Additionally,
unlike picketing or the gathering of petitions on private shopping
mall property, a software robot's expressive activity does not cause any
disruption to commercial business occurring on the website. 362 Also,
the typical software robot causes absolutely no harm to the website
owner's computer system or the integrity of the data contained
therein. 363
The CFAA as currently drafted and interpreted by recent court
decisions grants too much proprietary control to website owners at the
public's expense. 364 These decisions upset the careful balance of
rights that the Copyright Act has struck between authors and soci
ety.365 Using this power, these owners of publicly accessible Internet
354. See Pruneyard. 447 U.S. at 88; see also O'Rourke; sufrra note 18, at 619; Berger, sufrra
note 327, at 67~4.
355. Facts are not entitled to protection because they are not "original." Feist Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
356. ld. at 347-48.
357. Elkin-Karen, sufrra note 12, at 182.
358. Jd.
359. See sufrra Part IV.
360. O'Rourke, sufrra note 18, at 565.
361. ld. at 565-66.
362. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (noting that while the defendant's robot accessed eBay 100,000 times daily, the de
fendant's queries only constituted at most 1.53% of total daily requests).
363. Luh, sufrra note 98.
364. Elkin-Karen, sufrra note 12, at 182.
365. See Benkler, sufrra note 176, at 386-94 (discussing the relationship between copy·

right law and the First Amendment).
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sites have attempted to stifle the free flow of information in order to
prevent legitimate competition that could effect their bottom Iine.~ 66
To the extent that relief from truly harmful robotic activity is war
ranted, the CFAA is not the appropriate vehicle for providing redress.
VII.

AN

AMENDMENT AND AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE

CFAA

As discussed above, the CFAA was never designed to protect in
formation contained on publicly accessible websites. 367 Furthermore,
court interpretations that allow for the protection of facts in such
cases are constitutionally suspect. 368 Instead, the statute was promul
gated to provide relief to true victims of hacking, parties whose com
puter systems or confidential data actually had been compromised. 369
In order to ensure that the CFAA is properly utilized in the future, the
statute needs to be amended.
Earlier it was noted that all fifty states have some form of com
puter crime legislation. 370 In detailing the various offenses, two states,
namely Louisiana and Mississippi, include identical provisions which
provide that the criminal statute does not apply to "disclosure, use,
copying, taking or accessing by proper means." 371 The term "proper
means" is defined in part as "observation of the property in public use
or on public display." 372
Similar language could be added to the CFAA to ensure that
software robots can access and utilize information on publicly availa
366. Elkin-Karen, supra note 12, at 182.
367. See supra Part III.
368. See Feist Publ"ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,349-50 (1991) (explain·
ing that the Intellectual Property Clause offers copyright protection for original works, not
unoriginal facts).
369. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701
(2000)) (adding a civil remedy provision to the CFM).
370. See supra note 59 (providing a comprehensive list of state computer crime
legislation).
371. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:73.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); MISS. CooE ANN.§ 97-45-9
(2001).
372. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:73.1(11) (West 2001); M1ss. CooE ANN.§ 97-45-1 (k) (1994
& Supp. 2003). The full definition as provided in Mississippi's statute is as follows:
(k) "Proper means" includes:
(i) Discovery by independent invention;
(ii) Discovery by "reverse engineering"; that is, by starting with the known prod
uct and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. The
acquisition of the known product must be by laMul means;
(iii) Discovery under license or authority of the owner;
(iv) Observation of the property in public use or on public display; or
(v) Discovery in published literature.
/d.
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ble websites without violating the Act. The civil action provision 373
could be amended with the following language:
No action may be brought under this subsection for the dis
closure, use, copying, taking, or accessing of a computer to
obtain information on public display.
Further, "public display" could be defined as follows:
The term "public display" includes information available to
the public without a fee, including information on publicly
accessible Internet websites.
Although this exemption would apply to both copyrightable and un
copyrightable information, a copyright owner would not be prevented
from utilizing the copyright laws to obtain relief where warranted.
This proposed change to the CFAA is not meant to suggest that
an owner of a publicly accessible Internet site is completely without a
remedy. However, the proper theory upon which relief may be
granted must appropriately balance the website owner's proprietary
rights with the public benefit that ensues from the free flow of infor
mation. Dan Burk has suggested a modified version of the common
law claim of nuisance as an alternative to website owners' trespass ac
tions, but it would also appear to be an acceptable substitute for a
CFAA claim. 374 This is due to the fact that such a cause of action lies
only if the cost of the intrusive conduct outweighs the benefit. 375
Burk explains that "the 'muddy' nature of nuisance would allow com
puter owners on the Net to exclude unreasonably costly use of their
servers, while allowing access for socially beneficial uses, even if the
server owner might otherwise object." 376
Certainly a website owner would still have the option of physically
disconnecting from the Internet to avoid any undesirable uses, but
doing so would also result in the loss of the attendant benefits of be
. ing part of such a network. 377 However, as Burk points out, "proper
application of the nuisance standard would make this drastic action
unattractive on average to rational server owners." 378 Instead, website
owners more likely will tolerate the occasional "unwelcome" visitor or
"undesirable" use in order to take advantage of the commercial expo
sure that the placement of a website on the Internet brings. A remedy
373. 18 u.s.c. § 1030(g) (2003).
374. See Burk, supra note 255, at 53-54 (discussing digital nuisance as an alternative to
trespass actions).
375. Id. at 53-54.
376. /d. at 53.
377. /d.
378. Id.
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such as digital nuisance, therefore, would recognize that a website
owner has some limited proprietary rights in its Internet site, but en
sure that those rights are not exercised to the public's detriment.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The CFAA was enacted to provide protection from incidents of
computer hacking. 379 Despite recent court decisions suggesting the
contrary, 380 the statute was never intended to afford website owners
with a method for obtaining absolute control over access to and use of
information they have chosen to post on their publicly accessible In
ternet sites. Additionally, such sweeping interpretations of the CFAA
threaten the continued openness of the Internet and competition in
the marketplace to the public's detriment. 381 The CFAA, therefore,
needs to be amended to ensure that only those entities that have suf
fered the type of harm for which the statute was designed obtain re
lief. Hopefully this will also encourage courts, when faced with similar
types of claims in the future, to strike a more proper balance in ren
dering decisions on the proprietary rights of website owners.

379. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 3-5 (1996).
380. E.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(enjoining Verio from using a web robot to access publicly available factual information on
Register.com's website).
381. Elkin-Koren, sufna note 12, at 181-82.

